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LET PROPHETS BE (NON) PROFITS
David J. Herzig* and Samuel D. Brunson"

INTRODUCTION

Even organizations that support such odious values as racism
and homophobia are entitled, under the First Amendment to the
Constitution, to espouse their values without threat of punishment
by the government.' Free speech is central to U.S. democratic norms.
At the same time, the government has no obligation to subsidize
bad speech. In Bob Jones University v. United States,2 the Supreme
Court announced that the Internal Revenue Service ("IRS") could
constitutionally revoke the tax-exempt status of a religiously
affiliated university because of its racist policy. 3 The revocation was

*
Professor, Valparaiso University School of Law, Visiting Professor,
Loyola University (L.A.) School of Law.
** Professor, Loyola University Chicago School of Law. Professors Herzig
and Brunson would like to thank Lloyd Mayer (Notre Dame), Philip Hackney
(LSU), Ben Leff (American) and the participants at the Fourth Annual Tax
Symposium at the University of Washington School of Law, the Loyola Los
Angeles Tax Policy Seminar, and ClassCrits IX as well as research assistant
Andrew Pappas for their help in the research and revision of the Article, without
binding them to conclusions with which they disagree.
1. Hustler Magazine, Inc. v. Falwell, 485 U.S. 46, 50-51 (1988) (noting that
protection of communication is deemed necessary for the processes of democracy);
Steven H. Shiffrin, Racist Speech, Outsider Jurisprudence, and the Meaning of
America, 80 CORNELL L. REV. 43, 48-50 (1994). See generally Jeannine Bell,
Restraining the Heartless: Racist Speech and Minority Rights, 84 IND. L.J. 963
(2009) (dissecting "racist speech" and arguing for improvements in the regulation
of racist speech); Robert C. Post, The Constitutional Concept of Public Discourse:
Outrageous Opinion, Democratic Deliberation,and Hustler Magazine v. Falwell,
103 HARV. L. REV. 601 (1990) (examining the use of the First Amendment to
immunize from regulation the concept of "public discourse"); Robert C. Post, The
Social Foundations of Defamation Law: Reputation and the Constitution, 74
CALIF. L. REV. 691 (1986) (exploring the competing interests of the state and the
First Amendment in protecting reputation and freedom of expression); Cass R.
Sunstein, Free Speech Now, 59 U. CHI. L. REV. 255 (1992) (providing an
examination of the current system of free expression as an elaboration on the
American understanding of sovereignty). But see Mari J. Matsuda, Public
Response to Racist Speech: Consideringthe Victim's Story, 87 MICH. L. REV. 2320,
2321-22 (1989) (arguing against First Amendment protection of racist speech).
2. 461 U.S. 574 (1983).
3. Id. at 574-75.
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constitutional even though the racism derived from the university's
religious beliefs. 4
Although the conclusion makes sense-and may even be rightwe argue that Bob Jones embraces the fundamental public policy rule
for tax-exempt organizations that misunderstood the relationship
between subsidy, tax exemption, and tax deductibility. As a result of
the Supreme Court's misunderstanding, it took the right route to
arrive at the wrong place.5 By applying fundamental public policy to
an entity's qualification for exemption, we argue, the Supreme Court
inappropriately imposes on minority speech and does so without
preventing the subsidy of bad speech.
How did the Supreme Court err? It misunderstood tax exemption
as reflecting a subsidy to public charities. Tax exemption does not
represent a subsidy. As we will demonstrate, public charities do not
belong in the corporate income tax base. Because they do not belong
in the base, exempting them from paying taxes represents an
power. 6
taxing
application of the government's
accurate
Concomitantly, taxing public charities, far from fixing the
misapplication of a subsidy, gets the tax base wrong. And when the
7
tax base is wrong, taxes are both unfair and inefficient.

4. Samuel D. Brunson & David J. Herzig, A DiachronicApproach to Bob
Jones: Religious Tax Exemptions After Obergefell, 92 IND. L.J. 1175, 1189 (2017).
5. William N. Eskridge, Jr., Dynamic Statutory Interpretation, 135 U. PA.
L. REV. 1479, 1546-49 (1987); William N. Eskridge, Jr. & Philip P. Frickey,
Statutory Interpretationas PracticalReasoning, 42 STAN. L. REV. 321, 343-45

(1990).
6.

See generally William D. Andrews, Personal Deductions in an Ideal

Income Tax, 86 HARV. L. REV. 309 (1972) (arguing that charities are properly
exempted from the tax base because the intended effect of an income tax is to

curtail private, rather than public, consumption); Ilan Benshalom, The Dual
Subsidy Theory of CharitableDeductions, 84 IND. L.J. 1047 (2009) (discussing the
role of income tax as a method of providing incentives for certain behaviors,
including spending for the public good); Boris I. Bittker, Charitable
Contributions:Tax Deductions or Matching Grants?, 28 TAx L. REV. 37 (1972)
(discussing the definition of "exempt organizations" under § 501(c)(3), and the
unbiased enforcement of that definition pre-Bob Jones); John D. Colombo, The
Marketing of Philanthropy and the Charitable Contributions Deduction:
IntegratingTheories for the Deduction and Tax Exemption, 36 WAKE FOREST L.
REV. 657 (2001) (exploring the major economic theories justifying tax exemption

for charitable organizations); Mark P. Gergen, The Case for a Charitable
Contributions Deduction, 74 VA. L. REV. 1393 (1988) (applying the subsidy and
equity theories to charitable organizations to examine justifications of deductions
for charitable giving); Saul Levmore, Taxes as Ballots, 65 U. CHI. L. REV. 387
(1998) (noting the ability of taxpayers to subsidize "worthy" causes through § 170
contributions to § 501(c) organizations).
7. See, e.g., Beverly I. Moran, Stargazing:The Alternative Minimum Tax for
Individuals and Future Tax Reform, 69 OR. L. REV. 223, 241 (1990) ("The
comprehensive income tax base is an attempt to achieve fairness by forcing
taxable income to match economic income.").
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This is not to say that tax-exempt organizations receive no
federal subsidy. 8 But we take the position that in the nonprofit sector,
enforcement of the public policy doctrine should be executed
elsewhere. We derive this position from historic precedent examining
the role played by tax-exempt organizations as the guardians of
minority views. 9 We believe that a legitimate space in society should
exist and be populated by nonprofits to both espouse popular and
unpopular minority views. Under the specter of Bob Jones, some
unpopular minority views could be seen as violating public policy.
With those voices silenced, the nonprofit space they previously
occupied would become homogenous. This type of homogeneity is
normatively detrimental to a robust society. Therefore, in order to
allow nonconforming views, we propose that the proper sector to
house those views is in an expansionist version of the nonprofit sector.
The problem thus is not the tax-exempt status of entities under
26 U.S.C. § 501(c)(3). Rather, the problem is the interaction between
§§ 501(c)(3) and 170, because § 170 represents a government subsidy
of tax-exempt organizations.10 Collapsing these sections together
conflates the exemption from the deductible contributions. Decades
of tax scholarship have been dedicated to the question of whether or
not exemption of the entity represents a subsidy or not.1 ' Despite

8. Lloyd Hitoshi Mayer, The "Independent"Sector: Fee-for-Service Charity
and the Limits of Autonomy, 65 VAND. L. REV. 51, 82-85 (2012) (discussing the
beneficial role of the government in influencing nonprofits through government
funding of charitable causes).
9. Bob Jones Univ. v. United States, 461 U.S. 574, 609 (1983) (Powell, J.,
concurring); Walz v. Tax Comm'r of N.Y., 397 U.S. 664, 672-73 (1970); Jackson
v. Statler Found., 496 F.2d 623, 638-39 (2d Cir. 1974) (Friendly, J., dissenting
from denial of reconsideration en banc); Martha Minow, Should Religious Groups
Be Exempt from Civil Rights Laws?, 48 B.C. L. REV. 781, 783 (2007) (arguing for
alternatives to the "all exemptions or no exemptions" application of civil rights
laws to various religious groups). But see Douglas NeJaime, MarriageInequality:
Same-Sex Relationships, Religious Exemptions, and the Production of Sexual
OrientationDiscrimination, 100 CALIF. L. REV. 1169, 1170 (2012) ("By permitting
religious organizations, as well as some employers, property owners, and small
businesses, to discriminate against same-sex couples in situations far removed
from marriage itself, the 'marriage conscience protection' would threaten
substantial progress made in antidiscrimination law.").
10.

JOHN D. COLOMBO & MARK A. HALL, THE CHARITABLE

TAx

EXEMPTION 11,

193-94 (1995); Gergen, supra note 6, at 1397-98; Levmore, supra note 6, at 405;
David M. Schizer, Subsidizing CharitableContributions:Incentives, Information
and the Private Pursuitof Public Goals, 62 TAX L. REV. 221, 223 (2009).
11. STANLEY S. SURREY, PATHWAYS TO TAX REFORM 20-21 (1973); Andrews,
supra note 6, at 369-70; Boris I. Bittker & Kenneth M. Kaufman, Taxes and Civil
Rights: "Constitutionalizing"the Internal Revenue Code, 82 YALE L.J. 51, 63
(1972); Boris I. Bittker & George K. Rahdert, The Exemption of Nonprofit
Organizationsfrom Federal Income Taxation, 85 YALE L.J. 299, 357-58 (1976);
Henry Hansmann, Why Are Nonprofit Organizations Exempted from Corporate
Income Taxation?, in NONPROFIT FIRMS IN A THREE SECTOR ECONOMY 115, 121-22
(Michelle J. White ed., 1981); Harold M. Hochman & James D. Rodgers, The
Optimal Tax Treatment of CharitableContributions, 30 NAT'L TAX J. 1, 2 (1977);
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decades of alternative theories, the original thesis by Professor Boris
Bittker still makes the most sense1 2: charitable entities should be
tax-exempt because there are no individual owners. 13 Without
individual owners, there is no proxy for taxation of the charity. 14
Although there is robust debate about whether the exemption to
the entity is a subsidy, there is little debate that the deduction for
charitable donations is a subsidy.1 5 Admittedly, some have argued
that since there is no consumption, the § 170 deduction is not a
For example, Professor Bittker
subsidy under Haig-Simons.1 6
charitable donations in the
include
to
inequitable
it
was
that
believed
17
seminal article
Andrews's
William
Professor
contrast,
In
base.
in the Haigdeduction
contributions
for
the
charitable
that
proposed
be
personal
to
have
would
there
of
income,
definition
Simons
8
create
if
you
that
is
position
Andrews's
Professor
consumption.'
public or common goods they cannot be personal consumption, which
is not income.1 9 Despite attempts in 1917 and 1986 to advance the
position that the deduction for charitable donations is not a subsidy,
those arguments were never able to carry the day.
Rather than regulate charitable behavior through the threat of
revoking an organization's tax exemption, which would prevent
heterogeneity at the organizational levels, we propose a solution that
better matches the reality of the corporate tax base and will be more
effective at discouraging bad behavior. Specifically, we propose that
the IRS should enforce the fundamental public policy doctrine at the
deduction level. Doing so allows a pluralistic charitable world but
20
prevents the subsidization of the negative externality.

John K. McNulty, Public Policy and Private Charity:A Tax Policy Perspective, 3
VA. TAX REV. 229, 232 (1984); Donald B. Tobin, Political Campaigning by
Churches and Charities:Hazardous for 501(c)(3)s, Dangerous for Democracy, 95
GEO. L.J. 1313, 1317 (2007).
12. Bittker, supra note 6, at 42; Bittker & Rahdert, supra note 11, at 31516, 357-58.
13. Bittker & Rahdert, supra note 11, at 315-16, 357-58.
14.

Id.

15. Andrews, supra note 6, at 344; Tobin, supra note 11.
16. Andrews, supra note 6, at 344; Boris I. Bittker, Comprehensive Income
Taxation: A Response, 81 HARv. L. REV. 1032, 1034-35 (1968); Jeff Strnad,
Taxation of Income from Capital: A Theoretical Reappraisal, 37 STAN. L. REV.
1023, 1026 n.7 (1985).
17. Bittker, supra note 6, at 56-62 (explaining why donations to charitable
organizations should not be taxable).
18. Andrews, supra note 6, at 346.

19. Id. at 356; see also Paul Valentine, A Lay Word for a Legal Term: How
the Popular Definition of Charity Has Muddled the Perception of the Charitable
Deduction, 89 NEB. L. REV. 997, 1007 (2011) (explaining Professor Andrew's
argument that charitable gifts do not constitute consumption but rather the
creation of common goods).
20. Shannon Weeks McCormack, Taking the Good with the Bad: Recognizing
the Negative Externalities Created by Charities and Their Implications for the
CharitableDeduction, 52 ARIz. L. REV. 977, 977-78 (2010).
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This argument proceeds in four parts. Part I reviews the history
of the fundamental public policy doctrine. It explains how law
developed and the rationales for the Bob Jones decision. Part II
reviews the scholarly debate over whether tax exemption represents
a subsidy, a natural result of the tax base, or something else
altogether. Part III then brings to bear a sophisticated analysis of the
purposes behind the corporate income tax and how those purposes
relate to the function of public charities. Part IV then reviews the
history and purposes of the deduction for charitable donations. By
reviewing the history of the deduction, the rationales for the retention
or modification of the deduction can be properly situated. Finally,
Part V explains why the fundamental public policy rule is a poor fit
in determining whether an organization should qualify as taxexempt. We will demonstrate in Part V why fundamental public
policy is a better fit with tax deductions, and why applying it to
disallow deductions rather than exemptions is better tax policy and
better for society at large.
I. BOB JONES UNIVERSITY AND THE PUBLIC POLICY DOCTRINE
In a series of prior articles we have discussed the Supreme
Court's decision in Bob Jones University v. United States.2 1 In Bob
Jones, the Supreme Court held that the IRS could revoke the tax
exemption of a tax-exempt organization for violations of
"fundamental public policy." 22 We explored how and whether the IRS
could apply the fundamental public policy doctrines to racist
fraternities and organizations that discriminate based on sexual
orientation. 23 The lesson we learned from analyzing the fundamental
public policy doctrine is how clumsy and inadequate it is as a solution
to the problem of regulating the behavior of charities. This is why
many scholars view Bob Jones as an outlier. 24 But there is nothing
in the decision to indicate it is sui generis. 25
None of this is to say that the direct consequences of Bob Jones
were wrong: it may have represented the best way to prevent white
parents from thwarting school integration, as we discussed in an

21. See generally Brunson & Herzig, supra note 4 (suggesting safe harbor
regimes to aid tax-exempt organizations in complying with requirements for taxexemption post Bob Jones); David J. Herzig & Samuel D. Brunson, Tax
Exemption, Public Policy, and DiscriminatoryFraternities,35 VA. TAX REV. 116
(2015) (discussing the Court's recognition of § 501(i) as adopting Revenue Ruling
71-447 in Bob Jones).
22. Brunson & Herzig, supra note 4, at 1175.
23. Id. at 1215-16.
24. David A. Brennen, The Power of the Treasury: Racial Discrimination,
Public Policy, and "Charity"in Contemporary Society, 33 U.C. DAVIs L. REV. 389,
410 (2000); Eskridge, Jr., supra note 5, at 1547-48.
25. Anthony C. Infanti, A Tax Crit Identity Crisis? Or Tax Expenditure
Analysis, Deconstruction, and the Rethinking of a Collective Identity, 26 WHITTIER
L. REV. 707, 791-92 (2005).
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earlier article. 26 The Supreme Court may have seen this as the only,
or the best, avenue for solving the problem, and the justice of the
result is undeniable. But the clich6 that hard cases make bad law
exists for a reason. It is not clear that the case is properly decided
from a tax or a constitutional law perspective. 27 A key part of the
problem we have regarding Bob Jones is the mapping of the public
policy doctrine onto § 501(c)(3) entities through the individual tax
deduction statute of § 170.28
These same problems were presented in the concurrence and
dissent of the case. 29 Justice Powell, in concurrence, was hesitant to
believe that the sole function of a § 501(c)(3) charity was to "act on
behalf of the Government in carrying out governmentally approved
policies." 30
Justice Powell instead pointed to the historic role
§ 501(c)(3) charities have played "in encouraging diverse, indeed often
sharply conflicting, activities and viewpoints." 31
Perhaps a better view of Bob Jones is to recognize the case as the
final chapter in a long and systematic process of terminating racial
discrimination in the education system of the United States starting
with Brown v. Board of Education.32 Briefly, after Brown declared
the "separate but equal" doctrine unconstitutional in 1954, parents
tried to accomplish school segregation via private schools. 33 By using
private schools the parents could avoid the constitutional problem
posited in Brown.34
The IRS was not granted clarity as to whether this new class of
private segregated school violated the tax exemption and continued
to grant tax-exempt status to these institutions. 35 In 1965, after the
Civil Rights Act of 1964, the IRS stopped processing applications for
tax exemption from segregated private schools until 1967.36 If the
school was private, though, and did "not have such degree of
involvement with the political subdivision as has been determined by
26. Brunson & Herzig, supra note 4, at 1188-90.
27. Richard A. Epstein, Foreword: UnconstitutionalConditions, State Power,
and the Limits of Consent, 102 HARv. L. REV. 4, 95 (1988) ("The decision in Bob
Jones has generally received a warm response, but is nonetheless clearly
incorrect, once the problem of unconstitutional conditions is forthrightly
considered. The initial inquiry is whether the state could decide that its
'compelling interest' in eradicating racial segregation in education is sufficiently
strong to allow the state to impose a direct fine or criminal punishment on the

school for imposing those conditions on its students. The answer, I take it, is
no.").
28. Bob Jones Univ. v. United States, 461 U.S. 574, 598-99 (1983).
29. Id. at 606 (Powell, J., concurring); id. at 612-14 (Rehnquist, J.,
dissenting).

30. Id. at 609 (Powell, J., concurring).
31. Id.
32. 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
33. Brunson & Herzig, supra note 4, at 1188.
34. Id.
35. Id.
36. Herzig & Brunson, supranote 21, at 126.
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the courts to constitute State action for constitutional purposes," 37 the
IRS determined that it did not have authority to reject the school's
exemption application. 38
In response to the IRS ruling, a group of African-American
parents in Mississippi sued the IRS to enjoin it from granting taxexempt status to discriminatory schools. 39 The IRS not only followed
the district court order but also expanded the order by applying the
decision retroactively. 4 0 The IRS also began to look at private schools
that had already obtained exemptions and, if they discriminated on
the basis of race, would revoke their exemptions. 41 One such school
was Bob Jones University. 42
In Bob Jones, the Court answered the question that the IRS
assumed in application, whether a state law corporation doing
business as a university could qualify as tax-exempt under § 501(c)(3)
of the Internal Revenue Code ("Code"). 43 In the university's articles
of incorporation, the university stated that its purpose was "to
conduct an institution of learning . . ., giving special emphasis to the
Christian religion and the ethics revealed in the Holy Scriptures." 44
Although the university was not affiliated with any religious
denomination, the Court recognized it as "both a religious and
Its teachers are required to be devout
educational institution.
Christians, and all courses at the university are taught according to
the Bible." 4 5
The university's board of directors and officers held the belief
that the "Bible forbids interracial dating and marriage." 46 Thus, the
university excluded all nonwhites until 1971.47 From 1971 until 1975,
the university accepted applications from "Negroes married within
their race." 4 8 After the 1975 McCrary v. Runyon 49 decision, the
university modified its policy to permit nonwhites to apply but
50
continued to prohibit interracial dating and marriage.

37.
38.
39.
40.

Green v. Kennedy, 309 F. Supp. 1127, 1130 (D.D.C. 1970).
Id. at 1130-31.
Id. at 1129.
Brunson & Herzig, supra note 4, at 1188.

41.

Id.

42. Id. at 1186.
43. Bob Jones Univ. v. United States, 461 U.S. 574, 577 (1983).
44. Id. at 579-80.
45. Id. at 580.
46. Id.
47. Id.
48. Id.
49. 515 F.2d 1082 (4th Cir. 1975) (prohibiting racial exclusion from private
schools).
50. Bob Jones, 461 U.S. at 580-81 ("That rule read[]: There is to be no
interracialdating. 1. Students who are partners in an interracial marriage will

be expelled. 2. Students who are members of or affiliated with any group or
organization which holds as one of its goals or advocates interracial marriage will
be expelled. 3. Students who date outside their own race will be expelled. 4.
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In November of 1970, the IRS notified the university that the IRS
policy had changed following the Green v. Kennedy51 decision "and
announced its intention to challenge the tax-exempt status of private
schools practicing racial discrimination in their admissions
policies." 52 By April of 1975, the IRS formally notified the university
that the agency was revoking its exempt status and on "January 19,
1976, the IRS officially revoked the university's tax-exempt status,
effective as of December 1, 1970, the day after the university was
formally notified of the change in IRS policy." 5 3
Bob Jones University challenged the revocation of its tax-exempt
status by the IRS.54 The university relied on the statutory language
of § 501(c)(3) for the proposition that it was organized "exclusively
for . . . educational purposes" and under the plain meaning of the
statute was required to be granted tax-exempt status.5 5 After all, the
university was organized exclusively for educational purposes.5 6 In
an eight-to-one decision, the Supreme Court held that Bob Jones
University did not qualify as a tax-exempt entity because the
activities of the entity were "contrary to public policy." 57 In prior
articles, we explored how the Bob Jones decision is better viewed
through the continuum of both congressional and executive actions
and judicial decisions.5 8
For the purposes of this Article, it is important to look at the
methodology the Supreme Court used in deciding to take an
expansive "contextualist approach to the statute." 59 The Supreme
Court looked at the justification for tying a charitable organization's
60
income-tax exemption to a performance of public services to society.
"To reach this result, the Court employed the classic Hart and Sacks
61
purpose-of-the-statute approach."
In order to find the common law "fundamental public policy" in

§ 501(c)(3), the Supreme Court also considered § 170, which permits
a deduction by individual taxpayers for payments made to qualifying
§ 501(c)(3) organizations. 62 By tying together §§ 170 and 501(c)(3),
the IRS and then the Supreme Court were able to create a public
policy exception without considering whether the grant of § 501(c)(3)

Students who espouse, promote, or encourage others to violate the University's

dating
51.
52.
53.
54.
55.
56.
57.
58.
59.
60.
61.
62.

rules and regulations will be expelled.").
309 F. Supp. 1127 (D.D.C. 1970).
Bob Jones, 461 U.S. at 581.
Id.
Id.
Eskridge & Frickey, supra note 5, at 343-44.
Id. at 344.
Bob Jones, 461 U.S. at 582.
Brunson & Herzig, supra note 4, at 1187, 1207-08.
Eskridge & Frickey, supra note 5.
See Eskridge, Jr., supra note 5, at 1546-47.
Id. at 1546.
See id. at 1546-47.
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status alone was a subsidy or not.63 From the Supreme Court's
perspective, §§ 501(c)(3) and 170 together created an exemption that
was a subsidy. Thus, in order to grant an exemption, the Court could
read into either or both statutes a requirement to not violate the
purposes of the statue(s). The "Court concluded that the statutory
purpose would be thwarted by extending the tax exemption to
organizations such as Bob Jones University." 64
Because the Supreme Court combined the provisions to try to
glean original intent, the opinion is oft criticized by constitutional law
scholars. 65 When examined alone, the purpose of § 501(c)(3) is not so
simplistic. 6 6 Justice Powell, in concurrence, challenged the majority
position that the sole purpose of a tax-exempt entity is to act as a
substitute for the government in providing goods or services.67
Rather, Justice Powell pointed to the number of other Supreme Court
decisions that treated § 501(c)(3) as providing that "private, nonprofit
groups receive tax exemptions because 'each group contributes to the
diversity of association, viewpoint, and enterprise essential to a
vigorous, pluralistic society."' 68
Justice Powell continues:
I find it impossible to believe that all or even most of those
organizations could prove that they 'demonstrably serve and
[are] in harmony with the public interest" or that they are
"beneficial and stabilizing influences in community life.' Nor I
am prepared to say that petitioners, because of their racially
discriminatory policies, necessarily contribute nothing of
benefit to the community. 69
We believe that, had the Supreme Court considered the statutes
independently, perhaps, Justice Powell's views would have held the
line.
70
The only dissent in the case came from Justice Rehnquist.

Unlike the majority, Rehnquist viewed the exemption of § 501
separate and apart from § 170.71 He asserted that "[t]he Court first
seeks refuge from the obvious reading of § 501(c)(3) by turning to
§ 170 of the Code which provides a tax deduction for contributions
made to § 501(c)(3) organizations." 72 This promising disentanglement
approach quickly falls apart. Unfortunately, Justice Rehnquist falls
short in the same way the majority does by trying to glean legislative
63.

See Bob Jones Univ. v. United States, 461 U.S. 574, 585, 595-98 (1983).

64.

Eskridge, Jr., supra note 5, at 1547.

65.
66.
67.
68.
69.
70.
71.
72.

See, e.g., id.
See I.R.C. § 501(c)(3) (2012); Eskridge, Jr., supra note 5, at 1547.
Bob Jones, 461 U.S. at 608-09 (Powell, J., concurring).
Id. at 609.
Id.
Id. at 612-23 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
Id. at 614.
Id. at 613.
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intent of § 501 from § 170. Had Justice Rehnquist continued on the
path towards understanding the relationship between the statutes,
he might have won the day. Under § 170 there is no requirement that
73
the receipt qualify for tax exemption under § 501(c)(3).
In establishing a new policy, the Supreme Court did not apply
consistent scrutiny to the various authorities. For example, the
Supreme Court pointed to the civil rights legislation as authority for
a clear public policy preference against discrimination in educational
settings but failed to address that Congress did not codify that
preference. 74 According to Professor Eskridge, "Bob Jones is a classic
case in which the Hart and Sacks approach is invoked by the Court
as a substitute for careful analysis. The Court obviously created new
75
law in this case, going well beyond what Congress had done."
It is not to say that the Court was incorrect in adding the
fundamental public policy doctrine to the charitable sector. As we
have stated in prior articles, the Bob Jones decision was a culmination
of decades of clear signals by all three branches of government against
preferences for discriminatory behavior.76 Even the lone dissent does
not disagree with the result, just the method.77 Perhaps the Court
should have been clearer in stating this policy shift instead of
applying the Hart and Sacks approach.7 8 Professor Eskridge argues
that this approach obfuscates the rationales for the opinion and an
express statement by the Court should be required. "At least it is
honest: the Court's commitment to the public value of a
nondiscriminatory society is important enough to influence its
interpretation of an ambiguous statute."7 9 When viewed through this
lens, the Bob Jones decision might be understood as "an effort to
ensure that the IRS takes account of the widespread social
antagonism toward racial discrimination, as part of the general
80
thrust of contemporary 'public policy."'

73.
74.
75.
76.

77.

See I.R.C. § 170 (2012).
See Eskridge, Jr., supra note 5, at 1547.
Id.
Brunson & Herzig, supra note 4,.
Bob Jones, 461 U.S. at 622 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting) ("I have no

disagreement with the Court's finding that there is a strong national policy in

this country opposed to racial discrimination. I agree with the Court that
Congress has the power to further this policy by denying § 501(c)(3) status to
organizations that practice racial discrimination.

But as of yet Congress has

failed to do so. Whatever the reasons for the failure, this Court should not
legislate for Congress.").
78. Eskridge, Jr., supra note 5, at 1548 (stating "that the Supreme Court
often purports to rely on original legislative purposes in interpreting statutes,
while in fact using the Hart and Sacks purpose analysis to bend statutory
language to satisfy current policy goals").

79. Id.
80. Cass R. Sunstein, Interpreting Statutes in the Regulatory State, 103
HARv. L. REV. 405, 480 (1989).
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Bob Jones does not mandate that the IRS revoke the tax
exemptions of entities that violate a fundamental public policy.81 In
fact, outside of the context of racially discriminatory schools, the IRS
has rarely (if ever) revoked an exemption for violation of public policy
and has only denied exemptions on public policy grounds in rare
instances, as discussed above. 82 The rare instances where the IRS
has revoked or denied exemptions on public policy grounds certainly
do not represent a complete list of behaviors that violate public
policy. 83 And yet the IRS has not revoked the tax exemptions of
organizations that violate other fundamental public policies.84 How
can that be?
There are a handful of reasons that the IRS can ignore taxexempt organizations' bad behavior. The first is the Supreme Court's
decision in Bob Jones did not mandate the loss of exemption.8 5
Rather, it confirmed that revocations for the violation of fundamental
public policies were constitutionally permissible. 86 Though the IRS
can revoke exemptions, the Supreme Court did not create a
constitutional obligation for it to do so, and Congress has never
explicitly required the IRS to enforce the public policy rule either.8 7
This lack of constitutional or statutory obligation matters.
It
buttresses the fact that, both as a legal and a practical matter, the
IRS has complete discretion to not enforce the fundamental public
policy rule. How does the IRS have such unconstrained discretion
when it comes to not enforcing the public policy rule?
While the Supreme Court held that the IRS could
constitutionally revoke a tax-exempt organization's exemption if that
organization violated a "fundamental public policy," it did not provide
any guidance on what constituted a fundamental public policy, the
violation of which would warrant loss of exemption.8 8
Under the Supreme Court's analysis, then, the question of
whether racial discrimination violated a fundamental public policy
was easy. Three decades of concerted effort by all three branches of
the federal government demonstrated that the government wanted to
end racial discrimination and segregation. The Supreme Court did
not, however, say that three decades of concerted effort was necessary
to establish a fundamental public policy, only that it was sufficient. 89
Outside of clarifying that racial discrimination did violate
81. See Bob Jones, 461 U.S. at 597-98.
82. See Brunson & Herzig, supra note 4, at 1195; Nicholas A. Mirkay,
Globalism, Public Policy, and Tax-Exempt Status: Are U.S. CharitiesAdrift at
Sea?, 91 N.C. L. REV. 851, 870-74 (2013).
83. See Brunson & Herzig, supra note 4, at 1195.
84. Id.
85. Id.
86. Id.
87. Id.
88. See Bob Jones Univ. v. United States, 461 U.S. 574, 592 (1983).
89. See id. at 592-93.
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fundamental public policy, the Supreme Court provided the IRS with
no guidance in determining what else violated fundamental public
policy.90

Also, as we discussed, 91 the Bob Jones decision did not provide
any contours for determining the breadth of fundamental public
policy. 92 The IRS started applying fundamental public policy to
discriminatory schools in 1970 or so, sixteen years after Brown and
six years after the Civil Rights Act of 1964. Bob Jones was decided
more than a decade later than that 93 -fundamental public policy is a
lagging enforcement mechanism. If this ad hoc approach is how
enforcement takes place, then we have a problem.
In part, the problem arose because the Supreme Court conflated
the exemption of § 501 with the deduction for charitable contributions
of § 170. Revoking an organization's exemption is so punitive that it
makes sense that the IRS would avoid doing so. 94 To understand the
conflation of § 170 and § 501, we explore the independent evolution of
§ 501 and § 170. Through the following sections it becomes clear that
§ 501 developed not only independently from § 170 but for different
reasons. By examining these sections separately, the confused state
of affairs left after Bob Jones becomes clearer.
II. Is TAX EXEMPTION A SUBSIDY?
The idea that certain types of nonprofit organizations, including,
but not limited to, religious and charitable organizations, should be
exempt from paying taxes has deep roots in British and American
law. 95 The current tax exemption finds precedent both in the 1601
British Statute of Charitable Uses and in the constitutions of the
early states. 96 . The Code's current exemption regime is derived
directly from the Revenue Act of 1894, and, after the 1894 Act was
ruled unconstitutional, the regime was reenacted in 1909 and 1913,
when Congress enacted the modern corporate and personal income
taxes.9 7 The idea that nonprofit organizations should be exempt from
taxation appeared so intuitive and correct to Congress that it failed,
at the time and for years afterward, to explain why it had exempted
certain nonprofits from taxation. 98

90.

Brunson & Herzig, supra note 4, at 1189.

91. Id.
92. Id. at 1191-92.
93. See Bob Jones, 461 U.S. at 574.
94. See Samuel D. Brunson, Reigning in Charities: Using an Intermediate
Penalty to Enforce the CampaigningProhibition,8 PITT. TAx REV. 125, 154 (2011)
("In addition, as has been discussed, because of the devastating effect of [revoking
the tax exemption], there may be strong political and practical reasons not to

enforce the prohibition except in truly egregious cases.").
95.

Bittker & Rahdert, supra note 11, at 301.

96.
97.
98.

Id.
Id.
Id.
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Even today, after more than a century of tax exemption for
qualifying public charities, scholars and policymakers have failed to
agree on any consistent rationale for the tax exemption. 99 In spite of
the lack of an explicit justification for exempting certain nonprofit
entities from tax, the exemption remained uncontroversial for the
first several decades of the modern income tax. As recently as 1970,
the Supreme Court held that exempting religious organizations from
tax did not constitute state support for religion.1 00 According to the
Court, exemption could not have been "sponsorship since the
government does not transfer part of its revenue to churches but
simply abstains from demanding that the church support the
state." 0 1
A.

Bittker: Section 501(c)(3) Is Not a Subsidy

Even before the Supreme Court's decision, though, the idea that
the tax exemption represented a subsidy was already gaining ground
99. Mark A. Hall & John D. Colombo, The Donative Theory of the Charitable
Tax Exemption, 52 OHIo ST. L.J. 1379, 1381 (1991) [hereinafter Hall & Colombo,
Donative Theory] ("It is extraordinary that no generally accepted rationale exists
for the multi-billion dollar exemption from income and property taxes that is
universally conferred on'charitable' institutions."). Though there is no consensus
on the reason for tax exemption, when people think about it, they generally come
to one of a handful of conclusions. The two most common are that tax exemption
is meant to subsidize charitable activities and that charitable organizations do
not belong in the tax base. Mark A. Hall & John D. Colombo, The Charitable
Status of Nonprofit Hospitals: Toward a Donative Theory of Tax Exemption, 66
WASH. L. REV. 307, 328 (1991) [hereinafter Hall & Colombo, Hospitals]. Although
these are the primary justifications scholars have cited to explain the reasons for
tax exemption, scholars have proposed other justifications as well, including the
proposal that nonprofit charities should not be taxed in recognition that they
enjoy a limited degree of sovereignty. Evelyn Brody, Of Sovereignty and Subsidy:
Conceptualizingthe Charity Tax Exemption, 23 J. CORP. L. 585, 586 (1998). Even
the sovereignty argument can ultimately be categorized as a base definition one,
though: if the state lacks jurisdiction to tax a sovereign charity, that charity's
income does not belong in the tax base. This idea of tax-exempt organizations
enjoying parallel sovereignty is undercut, though, by two realities. First, as
Professor Brody points out, in certain circumstances, tax-exempt organizations
do pay taxes. Id. at 586-87, 606. Moreover, even when they do not pay taxes,
the tax law requires most tax-exempt organizations to prepare and file
information returns that lay out specific financial information related to taxexempt organizations. I.R.C. § 6033(a)(1) (2012). Among the central definitional
requirements of the concept of sovereignty is that the sovereign have some type
of independence from external control. Diane M. Ring, What's at Stake in the
Sovereignty Debate?: International Tax and the Nation-State, 49 VA. J. INT'L L.
155, 160 (2008). To be sovereign, a tax-exempt organization need not be entirely
free of outside control; after all, even nation-states face some limitations on their
independence. Id. at 161 ("Even the most powerful states must take into account
the desires, needs, and views of other states in pursuing their own agendas.").
But ultimately, tax-exempt organizations are still subject to the tax law and,
whether or not they pay taxes, must generally perform acts required by that law.

100. Walz v. Tax Comm'n of N.Y., 397 U.S. 664, 675 (1970).
101.

Id.
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among both judges and scholars. 102 By the end of the 1960s, Professor
Borris Bittker felt compelled to defend the nonprofit tax exemption
from charges of subsidy. 103 He recognized that, in the language of tax,
nonprofits are "exempted" from having to pay. He then argued that
"[o]nce this characterization is accepted, it is only a short step to such
104
pejoratives as 'loophole,' 'preference,' and 'subsidy."'
Professor Bittker argues that the tax exemption provided to
nonprofit organizations is not an exception to the generally applicable
tax law because tax law is fundamentally incompatible with nonprofit
organizations.
To apply tax accounting concepts to nonprofit
organization, he asserts, would stretch the accounting "to, or beyond,
the breaking point."O 5

Why would tax accounting be incompatible with nonprofit
organizations? Professor Bittker highlights several ways. The first
mismatch, he says, lies in determining what counts as gross
income. 106 How should the tax law treat dues, donations, and other
nonprofit revenue sources, he asks.107 Or, given its obligation to use
its money for charitable purposes, should the nonprofit be treated
merely as a conduit for that money?108
Moreover, even if tax law answered the question of what counted
as gross income, taxpayers do not pay taxes on their gross income. 109
Reaching taxable income, though, proves a difficult task for nonprofit
organizations. In general, taxpayers arrive at taxable income by
taking certain deductions. 110 The majority of deductible expenses are
those expenses associated either with the taxpayer's trade or
business"'1 or with other profit-making endeavors. 112
The concepts of trade or business and profit-making endeavors fit
uncomfortably at best on the framework of nonprofits. Professor
Bittker asks whether salaries to employees qualify as ordinary and
necessary trade or business expenses (a prerequisite for
deductibility).113 If they qualify, perhaps the money a nonprofit gives
to the indigent should also qualify as deducible. 114
102. Erika King, Tax Exemptions and the Establishment Clause, 49 SYRACUSE
L. REV. 971, 993 (1999).
103. See Boris I. Bittker, Churches, Taxes and the Constitution, 78 YALE L.J.
1285, 1290 (1969).
104. Id.
105. Bittker & Rahdert, supra note 11, at 307-08.

106. Id. at 308-09.
107. Id.
108. Id. at 309.
109. See I.R.C. §§ 1(a), 63(a) (2012). In fact, for a foreign tax to qualify as an
income tax for U.S. foreign tax credit purposes, it must reach the taxpayers' net,
rather than gross, income. See Treas. Reg. § 1.901-2(b)(1) (as amended in 2013).
110. See I.R.C. §§ 62, 63.

111. See id. § 162(a).
112. See id. § 212.
113.
114.

Bittker & Rahdert, supra note 11, at 309.
Id. at 310.
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Professor Bittker also lays out a third reason that the income tax
law as presently constituted is a poor match for nonprofit firms. 115
Even if tax law could figure out what to include in a nonprofit's gross
income, and even if it could determine what expenses the nonprofit
should be permitted to deduct, it would further have to determine the
appropriate tax rate for the nonprofit. 116 The current corporate rates
may not fit. The tax rate a taxpayer pays should have some relation
to the benefit she receives or to her ability to pay. 117 And for various
reasons (including who actually bears the incidence of the tax, which
economists still debate), it is difficult to figure out ability to pay or
benefits received. 118
B.

In Response to Bittker
In spite of Professor Bittker's best efforts over the last halfcentury, viewing tax exemption as a subsidy to nonprofits has taken
firm hold.119 Activists commonly argue that organizations at odds
with their activism should lose their tax-exempt status, implicitly
viewing exempt status as a subsidy that should not be granted to
organizations that endorse bad views. 120 And even today, scholars
assert that exemption represents a subsidy, albeit often without any
analysis. 121
It is not absurd to assert that tax exemption represents a subsidy,
of course. Such a view makes intuitive sense. A tax-exempt nonprofit
that earns $100 gets to keep that full $100.122 Alternatively, we can
imagine a tax system where the government collects taxes at a 35%
rate1 23 from all corporations, including nonprofits. In that world, a
nonprofit would pay $35 of taxes when it earned $100. Imagine in
that world that the government then provides a $35 grant to
nonprofits for every $100 they earn.
There is no doubt that in the hypothetical world, the government
subsidizes nonprofits. Economically, though, the tax exemption
functions exactly the same way: in both the real and hypothetical
worlds, the nonprofit has $100 after taxes.
115. See id. at 314.
116. See id.
117. See id. at 315.
118. See id.
119. See King, supra note 102.
120. For example, LGBTQ+ rights activists argue that churches that have
opposed same-sex marriage should lose their exemption. See, e.g., Nate Carlisle,
TV Campaign Targeting Mormon Church's Tax-Exemption Kicks Off in Utah,
SALT LAKE TRIB. (Jan. 26, 2017), http://archive.sltrib.com/article.php?id
=4803801&itype=CMSID.
121. See, e.g., Linda Sugin, Invisible Taxpayers, 69 TAX L. REV. 617, 621 (2016)
("[T]he purpose of tax exemption is to subsidize private organizations that
produce third-party benefits . . . .").
122. See I.R.C. § 501(a), (c) (2012).
123. Under the current corporate income tax, corporations owe taxes at a
marginal rate of up to 35%. Id. § 11(b)(1).
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Of course, just because the two are identical economically does
not mean that both represent subsidies. The question of whether tax
exemptions function as subsidies ultimately depends on whether "the
income tax exemption for charities is consistent with normal income
tax principles or is a departure that must be justified as a subsidy." 124
In other words, if we assume that all corporations should naturally
pay taxes, then allowing certain organizations to avoid paying taxes
represents a special legislative gift to those organizations.
Professor Daniel Halperin argues that exempting nonprofits
represents a departure from normal tax principles. According to
Professor Halperin, "There is nothing about the nature of the
charitable organization that precludes income taxation." 125 In fact,
according to Professor Henry Hansmann, taxing nonprofit
organizations would be easy: most are "commercial" nonprofits, with
analogues in the for-profit sector. 12 6 These kinds of nonprofit
organizations could carry over their tax accounting from their forprofit counterparts. 12 7
To Professor Hansmann's point, allowing a subsidy for nonprofit
organizations that engage in the same businesses as for-profit
organizations seems unwarranted and, perhaps, unfair, especially
when some of those tax-exempt organizations are wealthy. 128 If the
point of the corporate income tax were to tax wealth, or even to tax
revenue, then exempting nonprofit organizations with significant
revenue streams certainly feels like a subsidy of their activities.
In the end, Professor Bittker's assertion that nonprofits "are not
suitable targets for an income tax" 129 is not fully supported by his
reasoning.
Certainly, he makes the case that taxing nonprofits
appropriately is both complicated and administratively difficult. As
a practical matter, the costs of getting it right may weigh in favor of
leaving nonprofits alone for tax purposes.
On the other hand, it may not be so administratively difficult.130
Many nonprofits derive a significant portion of their revenue not from
donations but from providing goods and services. 13 1 Some types of
traditional nonprofit organizations can also be operated as for-profit

124. Daniel Halperin, Is Income Tax Exemption for Charities a Subsidy?, 64
TAX L. REV. 283, 283-84 (2011).

125.

Id. at 284.

126. See Henry Hansmann, The Rationale for Exempting Nonprofit
Organizationsfrom CorporateIncome Taxation, 91 YALE L.J. 54, 59 (1981).
127. Id.
128. In 2014, for example, more than 24,000 tax-exempt organizations
reported holding assets worth $10 million or more. Table 1. Form 990 Returns of
501(c)(3) Organizations: Balance Sheet and Income Statement Items, by Asset
Size, Tax Year 2014, IRS (July 2017), https://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-soil4eo0l.xls.
129. Bittker & Rahdert, supra note 11, at 304.
130. Hansmann, supra note 126 ("But Bittker and Rahdert overstate the
difficulties [of nonprofits calculating taxable income].").

131. Id.
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For instance, the operation of for-profit and
organizations. 132
nonprofit hospitals is nearly identical. 133 If the only reason to exempt
the nonprofit hospital is that it is difficult to figure out its income and
deductions, it would appear that tax law could treat it similarly to the
for-profit hospital. There would be differences of course-the forprofit hospital seems less likely to receive donations from the publicbut those questions can ultimately be answered.
If the only reason for exempting nonprofits from generally
applicable taxes is the administrative difficulties of taxing them, then
the tax exemption would probably constitute a subsidy to the exempt
nonprofit, even if Congress did not intend to provide a subsidy.
III. SECTION 501(C)(3) TAX-EXEMPT STATUS DOES NOT REPRESENT A
SUBSIDY
We agree with Professor Hansmann that taxing nonprofits does
not raise insuperable problems. Certainly, as Professor Bittker
argues, it may prove difficult to accurately tax some nonprofits. 134
But it is also administratively difficult to accurately tax partners in a
partnership, and yet the federal income tax subjects partners to tax
Difficulty is different than
on their partnership income. 135
impossibility, and, if exemption is only the result of administrative
difficulty, it effectively represents a subsidy, even if it is not meant as
such.
Notwithstanding these (and other) compelling arguments that
exemption represents a subsidy, we agree with Professor Bittker that
exempting nonprofits from taxation is consistent with normal income
tax principles and, as such, does not represent a subsidy to such
organizations. We come to this conclusion on different grounds than
he does, however. We argue that the tax law does not apply to
nonprofit organizations by their very nature. Nonprofits are excluded
from paying taxes-not because society likes them or because it wants
to subsidize the good things they do but rather because qualifying
nonprofits do not belong in the tax base.

132. See id.
133. David A. Hyman, Hospital Conversions: Fact, Fantasy, and Regulatory
Follies, 23 J. CORP. L. 741, 760 n.69 (1998).

134. See Bittker & Rahdert, supra note 11, at 314.
135.

See Darryll K. Jones, Towards Equity and Efficiency in Partnership

Allocations, 25 VA. TAx REV. 1047, 1076 (2006) ("At what point does the
administrative difficulty of accurately measuring income earned via partnerships

and then collecting the tax from the proper person create too much inefficiency?
This article asserts that the present bar is set way too low.").
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A.
The Historical(and Current)Justificationfor the Corporate
Income Tax
The United States first experimented with taxing income during
the Civil War. 136 During that first decade-long income tax, however,
Congress gave no thought to the proper manner in which to tax
corporations. 137 Rather, like partnerships, the income tax treated
corporations as pass-through entities, and shareholders had to pay
taxes on their pro rata share of corporate income, whether or not the
corporation paid out a dividend. 138 The exclusion of corporations from
the tax base during the Civil War was not absolute: the federal
government did tax companies in certain industries (such as banking,
transportation, and insurance) on their dividends and undistributed
profits.1 39
Because many companies in these industries were
incorporated, these taxes may have seemed like corporate income
taxes, but they were not aimed at corporate income or borne by the
corporation.
Rather, they functioned like a withholding tax on
shareholder income. 140 Still, the industries targeted by this tax
largely used the corporate form, and the Civil War tax on the income
of particular entities functioned as a precursor to the modern
corporate income tax.141
The original federal income tax expired, unrenewed, in 1872.142
Although members of Congress proposed dozens of income tax bills
following the expiration of the Civil War income tax, for more than
two decades none even made it to the floor for a vote. 143 In 1894,
though, Congress enacted a new progressive income tax.1 4 In a break
from the Civil War tax, the Revenue Act of 1894 did not treat
corporations and partnerships the same; under the new law,

136. Sheldon D. Pollack, The First National Income Tax, 1861-1872, 67 TAX
LAW. 311, 311 (2014).
137. See Steven A. Bank, A Capital Lock-In Theory of the CorporateIncome
Tax, 94 GEO. L.J. 889, 915 (2006) ("During the Civil War and Reconstruction,
there was literally no distinction between corporations and partnerships under
the income tax laws enacted to meet the heavy demands of war finances.").
138. Id.
139. Id.
140. Id. at 916. That these taxes were not meant to tax corporate income is
underlined by the fact that shareholders who received dividends from businesses
in these industries that had been taxed could exclude the dividends from their
taxable income. Id.
141. STEVEN A. BANK, FROM SWORD TO SHIELD: THE TRANSFORMATION OF THE
CORPORATE INCOME TAX, 1861 TO PRESENT 1-2 (2010).
142. Calvin H. Johnson, Fixing the Constitutional Absurdity of the
Apportionment of Direct Tax, 21 CONST. COMMENT. 295, 342 (2004).
143. Sheldon D. Pollack, Origins of the Modern Income Tax, 1894-1918, 66
TAX LAW. 295, 299 (2013).
144. Id. at 305-06.
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corporations became taxpayers and, like individuals, owed taxes of
2% on their income. 145
Even in 1894, Congress debated whether the income tax could,
much less should, reach corporations. 14 6 The proponents of the
corporate income tax justified taxing corporations as entities largely
because, unlike partnerships, corporations provided limited liability
to shareholders.1 47 Limited liability protects a shareholder's personal
assets from creditors of the corporation the shareholder owns.1 48 In
fact, the original House version of the tax applied to for-profit
corporations "by means of which the liability of the individual
stockholders is in anywise limited."1 49 While the Senate ultimately
eliminated the explicit requirement that corporations provide limited
liability to be subject to income taxation, 150 the debate on the Senate
floor indicates that Senators, too, felt that limited liability justified
the different tax treatment of corporations and partnerships.151
Although Congress had decided to tax all corporations,1 52 not just
those in certain industries, even this corporate income tax did not
demonstrate that Congress viewed corporations as part of the natural
tax base. Again, the corporate income tax was aimed at taxing
something of value to shareholders.15 3 That is, limited liability-the
basis for imposing the corporate income tax-is primarily beneficial
to those who own shares of a corporation, not to the corporation itself.
True, limited liability makes it easier for a corporation to raise capital
from small investors, who would not be willing to invest their money
into an endeavor they do not control if they could potentially be found
liable for the corporation's debts.1 54 But the primary benefit of limited
liability is to shareholders themselves, who are able to capture the
upsides of corporate transactions while not fully internalizing
losses.155
And the corporate income tax was justified as an
145. Jeffrey A. Maine, Linking Limited Liability and Entity Taxation: A
Critique of the ALI Reporters' Study on the Taxation of Private Business
Enterprises, 62 U. Pirr. L. REV. 223, 227-28 (2000).
146. Marjorie E. Kornhauser, Corporate Regulation and the Origins of the
CorporateIncome Tax, 66 IND. L.J. 53, 87 (1990).
147. Maine, supra note 145, at 228.
148. Andrew Price, Tort CreditorSuperpriorityand Other Proposed Solutions
to CorporateLimited Liability and the Problem of Externalities, 2 GEO. MASON U.
L. REV. 439, 439 (1995).
149. 26 CONG. REC. 6831 (1894).
150. Kornhauser, supra note 146.
151. Maine, supra note 145, at 228.
152. See id. at 227-28.
153. See id. at 228.
154. See, e.g., David Millon, Piercing the Corporate Veil, Financial
Responsibility, and the Limits of Limited Liability, 56 EMORY L.J. 1305, 1312
(2007).
155. Limited liability presents a specific type of negative externality. It allows
shareholders to "externalize part of the costs of their investment onto other
corporate constituencies and, in a sense, to society at large." Stephen M.
Bainbridge, Abolishing Veil Piercing, 26 J. CORP. L. 479, 488 (2001).
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appropriate payment for that benefit received by shareholders. 15 6 In
short, like the Civil War tax imposed on corporations in some
industries, the 1894 corporate income tax essentially provided a
convenient way to collect taxes on a benefit received by shareholders.
The 1894 federal income tax ultimately proved short-lived. In
1895, a divided Supreme Court held that significant portions of the
Revenue Act of 1894 were constitutionally impermissible direct
taxes. 15 7 Moreover, the Court held that the impermissible direct
taxes would raise such a large portion of the revenue that they could
not be separated from the indirect taxes. 15 8 As a result, the Court
struck down the entire 1894 federal income tax. 159
The Supreme Court's Pollock v. Farmers' Loan & Trust Co.160
decision led, inexorably, to the Sixteenth Amendment, ratified in
1913, which permitted income taxation without apportionment. 16 1 In
1909, the same year Congress proposed the Sixteenth Amendment, 162
it also moved ahead with a second attempt at taxing corporations. 16 3
To ensure its constitutionality, Congress styled its 1909 tax as a
corporate excise tax; that excise tax was imposed on corporate income,
though, making it effectively a corporate income tax. 164 Two years
later, the Supreme Court upheld the constitutionality of that tax.165
And two years after that, when the Sixteenth Amendment was
ratified, Congress replaced the corporate excise tax (on income) with
a corporate income tax.166
The early twentieth-century Congress had two motives in
imposing a tax on corporations: it wanted both to raise revenue and
regulate corporate power. 16 7 In justifying the corporate excise (and
then income) tax, proponents focused on the benefits incorporation
provided and on how the corporate income tax would serve as a type
of withholding tax on shareholder income.1 68 In addition to its role in
raising revenue, the corporate income tax was a cautious stab at the
federal regulation of corporations.1 69

156. Maine, supra note 145, at 224 n.6.
157. Pollock v. Farmers' Loan & Trust Co., 158 U.S. 601, 636-37 (1895).
158. Id. at 637.
159. Id.
160. 158 U.S. 601 (1895).
161. Bruce Ackerman, Taxation and the Constitution, 99 COLUM. L. REV. 1, 5
(1999).
162. Id. at 33.
163. See Reuven S. Avi-Yonah, Corporations,Society, and the State: A Defense
of the CorporateTax, 90 VA. L. REV. 1193, 1215-17 (2004).
164. See id. at 1216.
165. Patrick E. Hobbs, Entity Classification:The One Hundred-Year Debate,
44 CATH. U. L. REV. 437, 456 (1995).
166. Pollack, supra note 143, at 327 n.219.
167. AJAY K. MEHROTRA, MAKING THE MODERN AMERICAN FISCAL STATE: LAW,
POLITICS, AND THE RISE OF PROGRESSIVE TAXATION, 1877-1929, at 254 (2013).

168.
169.

Avi-Yonah, supra note 163, at 1217-18.
Kornhauser, supra note 146, at 53.

2017]

LET PROPHETS BE (NON) PROFITS

1131

The tax's regulatory role comprised two parts: first, corporate tax
returns would be public, and second, that publicity would allow both
the government and the public at large to see what corporations
did.170 In addition to the publicity side of the corporate income tax's
regulatory purposes, some legislators saw the corporate income tax
as a "preliminary measure to control and limit managerial power
directly."1 7 1

The idea of using the corporate income tax to tax shareholders
seems at odds with the idea of using the corporate income tax to
regulate (directly or indirectly) corporations.
The first appears
largely to ignore the separate existence of the corporation, while the
latter appears to accept the corporation as its own entity. It is worth
noting that neither justification for a corporate income tax sees the
tax's incidence as falling on the entity itself. Either the tax is a way
to tax shareholder income, or it is a way to ensure that the
government can regulate what management does. The origins of the
modern corporate income tax do not point to the corporation as an
appropriate target of taxation. 172
That view of the corporate income tax as doing something other
than taxing corporations has continued until the present day.
Professors Richard and Peggy Musgrave explain that even today, the
corporate income tax can best be viewed "as a mere device for
integrating corporate income into the individual income tax," not as
a tax on corporate income itself. 173 They further argue that any claim
that the corporation itself bears the incidence of corporate taxation
"is hardly tenable." 174 Professor Reuven Avi-Yonah broadly agrees,
arguing that the corporate income tax is necessary but that its
purpose is "to limit excessive accumulations of power in the hands of
corporate management, which is inconsistent with both democratic
and egalitarian ideals."175
Just because the corporate income tax has been conceived of, both
historically and currently, as a tax on shareholder income and as a
limitation on the power of corporate boards does not mean that those
are the only possible justifications for the tax. The consistency and
longevity of these justifications strongly supports their validity,
though, as does the general lack of other principled justifications. The
corporate income tax could, for example, exist solely as a revenueraising mechanism.17 6 But if its sole reason for existing were to raise
170. Avi-Yonah, supra note 163, at 1218.
171. Id. at 1221.
172. See RICHARD A. MUSGRAVE & PEGGY B. MUSGRAVE, PUBLIC FINANCE IN
THEORY AND PRACTICE 386 (4th ed. 1984).
173. Id.
174. Id. at 387.
175. Avi-Yonah, supra note 163, at 1249.
176. Although the percentage of federal revenue raised by the corporate
income tax has declined sharply over the last half-century, it still accounts for
about 11% of federal revenue. Policy Basics: Where Do Federal Tax Revenues
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revenue, the corporate income tax would face at least one significant
theoretical problem. If all the government wants is revenue, there is
no particular reason why the Congress should impose the corporate
income tax. Congress could just as easily raise individual income tax
rates, create a new tax, or even impose a head tax.1 77 An alternative
explanation of the corporate income tax must explain why the tax
focuses on corporate income rather than some other source.
B.

The Foundationsof Tax Exemption

The idea that tax regimes should exempt certain charitable
organizations from their scope predates the income tax and may be
as old as taxes themselves.1 78 And the history of exempting certain
types of charitable institutions from taxation in the United States
predates not only the income tax but the United States itself.1 7 9 Early
colonists brought the idea of tax exemption with them from their
European places of origin. 80 Even in colonial years, religious and
educational institutions often found themselves exempt from local
taxes. 181
Although the common law did not require colonial
governments to exempt religious property from taxation, the
necessary legislative acts were readily enacted, provided the property
met a handful of requirements.1 82
Colonial America did not have an income tax, but in Connecticut,
for example, "[c]hurch lands were exempt from property taxation."1 83
Throughout New England, religious and educational institutions
were exempt from tax, not only because they were considered public
institutions but because New England tax regimes tended to be
"levied on polls, on the estimated productivity of land, and on the
profitability of certain occupations." 8 4 Because these public charities

Come From?, CTR. ON BUDGET POL'Y PRIORITIES, http://www.cbpp.org/research
/policy-basics-where-do-federal-tax-revenues-come-from (last updated Sept. 5,
2017).
177. In fact, where revenue is the sole concern, a head tax might be preferable
to a corporate income tax, given that there is no way for a taxpayer to avoid a
head tax liability by changing her behavior. Nancy C. Staudt, The Hidden Costs
of the ProgressivityDebate, 50 VAND. L. REV. 919, 929-30 n.26 (1997).
178. Hall & Colombo, Donative Theory, supra note 99, at 1381 n.1.
179. See Christine R. Moore, Comment, Religious Tax Exemption and the
"CharitableScrutiny" Test, 15 REGENT U. L. REV. 295, 298 (2003).
180. Stephen Diamond, Efficiency and Benevolence: Philanthropic tax
Exemptions in 19th-Century America, in PROPERTY-TAX EXEMPTION
CHARITIES: MAPPING THE BATTLEFIELD 115, 116 (Evelyn Brody ed., 2002).

FOR

181. John D. Colombo, Why Is HarvardTax-Exempt? (And Other Mysteries of
Tax Exemption for Private Educational Institutions), 35 ARIZ. L. REV. 841, 844
(1993).

182. John Witte, Jr., Tax Exemption of Church Property:HistoricalAnomaly
or Valid ConstitutionalPractice?, 64 S. CAL. L. REV. 363, 371-74 (1991).
183.

ALVIN RABUSHKA, TAXATION IN COLONIAL AMERICA 184 (2008).

184. Peter Dobkin Hall, Is Tax Exemption Intrinsic or Contingent? Tax
Treatment of Voluntary Associations, Nonprofit Organizations, and Religious
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did not match up with the bases on which colonial New England taxes
were imposed, they were appropriately excluded from the tax base.
Early Americans did not refer to the "tax base" to justify their
exemptions, though.18 5 Even through the nineteenth century, the
policy arguments eventually came to characterize the discussion of
tax exemption (especially the argument that the benefit derived from
these organizations must outweigh the lost revenue from the
exemptions). 186 Rather, churches and educational institutions were
exempt from taxation through some combination of inertia and a
sense that their "continued existence was desirable." 187 Moreover, the
idea of exemption would have been less salient at the time. The
colonies and the early Republic lacked an income tax: annual taxation
did not become a regular part of American life until nearly halfway
through the nineteenth century. 188 Because states only imposed
taxes during emergencies, there was no clear way to calculate the
value of tax exemptions ex ante. 189
Out of financial necessity, the Civil War brought the United
States its first federal income tax. 190 Although the Civil War income
tax technically did not include a corporate income tax, 19 1 the Treasury
Department ruled explicitly that the "income of literary, scientific, or
other charitable organizations, in the hands of trustees or others, is
not subject to income tax." 192 After the federal income tax expired, 193
the administrative exemption for income of charitable organizations
became irrelevant. As a result, any questions around tax exemption
lay dormant until 1894.
The Revenue Act of 1894 included a 2% tax on the "net profits or
income" of an enumerated list of businesses, which included all
"corporations, companies, or associations doing business for profit in
The 1894 Act explicitly exempted
the United States." 194
"corporations, companies, or associations organized and conducted

Bodies in New Haven, Connecticut, 1750-2000, in PROPERTY-TAx EXEMPTION FOR
CHARITIES: MAPPING THE BATTLEFIELD, supra note 180, at 253, 254.

185.
186.
187.
188.
189.
190.
United

See Moore, supra note 179, at 296-97.
Diamond, supra note 180.
Id. at 117.
Id. at 119.
Id.
STEVEN A. BANK ET AL., WAR AND TAXES 36-37 (2008). Though new in the
States, the idea of an income tax was not entirely novel by the Civil War.

The modern income tax was originally conceived and enacted by Great Britain in
1799. 1 PETER HARRIS, INCOME TAX IN COMMON LAW JURISDICTIONS: FROM THE
ORIGINS TO 1820, at 1 (2006).
191. See supra notes 136-41 and accompanying text.
192. GEORGE S. BOUTWELL, A MANUAL OF THE DIRECT AND EXCISE TAX SYSTEM

IN THE UNITED STATES 275 (1863) (Treas. Dec. 110 (1863)).
193.

See supra note 142 and accompanying text.

194.

Revenue Act of 1894, ch. 349, § 32, 28 Stat. 509, 556. Although the tax

was imposed on most for-profit businesses, it explicitly exempted partnerships.

Id.
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solely for charitable, religious, or educational purposes." 195 And,
although the Supreme Court struck the 1894 Act down as
unconstitutional
a year later, 196 effectively, the 1894 exemption
became the basis for the modern tax exemption for public charities.
C.

Tax-Exempt OrganizationsDo Not Belong in the Tax Base

The corporate income tax was conceived of broadly to indirectly
tax shareholders' income and to regulate corporations by preventing
corporate managers from accumulating too much money. 197 How do
those purposes map on to tax-exempt organizations? Not well, it
turns out.
1.

"No PrivateInurement" PreventsEconomic Ownership

To qualify for tax exemption, an organization must meet several
requirements. For our purposes, a central qualification requirement
is that "no part of the net earnings of [the tax-exempt organization]
inures to the benefit of any private shareholder or individual." 198 For
purposes of the prohibition on private inurement, "private
shareholder or individual" means any person with a "personal and
private interest in the activities of the organization." 199
In addition to the federal tax prohibition on private inurement,
state law governs the distributions nonprofit organizations can
Nonprofit status does not mean, of course, that an
make. 200
organization cannot earn a profit; rather, it means that the
organization cannot distribute its profits to individuals. 201 It must
use its profits in pursuing its charitable purpose. 202
The tax and state law prohibitions on distributing profits do not
mean that tax-exempt organizations cannot make payments that
privately enrich individuals. 203 A tax-exempt organization canmust, in fact-compensate its employees. 204 Although excessive
compensation would constitute impermissible private inurement, as
long as the tax-exempt organization pays a reasonable salary, that
salary does not inure to the benefit of an insider. 205 Similarly, the

195. Id.
196. Nina J. Crimm, An Explanationof the FederalIncome Tax Exemption for
Charitable Organizations:A Theory of Risk Compensation, 50 FLA. L. REV. 419,
422 n.4 (1998).
197. See supra Subpart III.A.
198. I.R.C. § 501(c)(3) (2012).
199. Treas. Reg. § 1.501(a)-1(c) (as amended in 2014).
200. Henry B. Hansmann, Reforming Nonprofit CorporationLaw, 129 U. PA.
L. REV. 497, 501-02 (1981).
201. Id. at 501.
202. Id. at 501-02.
203. See id. at 505.
204. See id.
205. Founding Church of Scientology v. United States, 412 F.2d 1197, 1200
(Ct. Cl. 1969).
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prohibition on private inurement does not prevent insiders from
selling goods or services to a tax-exempt organization, provided the
insider receives "no more than fair market value" in exchange. 206
Moreover, the nondistribution constraints do not die with the taxexempt organization. Upon termination, a tax-exempt organization's
assets must go to its exempt purpose, to the state or federal
government, or to another tax-exempt organization. 207 If a would-be
tax-exempt organization provides that, upon termination, it will
distribute its assets to an insider, the organization does not qualify as
exempt. 20 8

The state law and tax prohibitions on private inurement
effectively eliminate any individual's ability to participate in the
profits of a tax-exempt organization. A tax-exempt organization
cannot currently distribute its profits nor can it hold those profits and
distribute them upon its termination. 209 As a result, the first
justification for the corporate income tax-to act as a backstop to the
individual income tax-does not apply in the tax-exempt context.
Taxing a tax-exempt organization does not effectively represent
withholding of shareholders' taxable income, because the tax-exempt
organizations generally do not have shareholders. Even if a taxexempt organization had shareholders, those shareholders could not
participate in the entity's profits.
The regulatory role of the corporate income tax is similarly
inapposite in the case of tax-exempt organizations. That is not to say
that the federal income tax does not serve any regulatory purpose
with respect to tax-exempt organizations. Tax law joins state law and
self-regulation in constraining what tax-exempt organizations do.210
But the regulatory role of the tax law functions in an entirely different
manner. 211
Congress intended that the corporate income tax regulate
corporations through publicity and through limiting the managerial
power of directors. 212 Although tax-exempt organizations do not pay
taxes, the tax law nonetheless requires them to file information
returns. 213 Unlike corporations, the tax returns of which are no
requires tax-exempt
generally
longer public, 214 the Code
206. Darryll K. Jones, The Scintilla of IndividualProfit: In Search of Private
Inurement and Excess Benefit, 19 VA. TAX REV. 575, 603 (2000).
207. Treas. Reg. § 1.501(c)(3)-1(b)(4) (as amended in 2014).
208. See, e.g., Rev. Rul. 66-259, 1966-2 C.B. 214.

209. Id.
210. Benjamin Moses Leff, Federal Regulation of Nonprofit Board
Independence:Focus on Independent Stakeholders as a "Middle Way", 99 KY. L.J.
731, 731 (2011).
211. See id. at 731-32.
212.

See supra notes 167-71 and accompanying text.

213. I.R.C. § 6033(a)(1) (2012).
214. Id. § 6103(a); see also Joshua D. Blank, Reconsidering Corporate Tax
Privacy, 11 N.Y.U. J.L. & Bus. 31, 44 (2014) ("Under current law, all tax return
information and tax returns of individuals and corporations are confidential.").
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organizations' returns to be available to the public. 2 15 Ironically, it is
exempt organizations' status as nontaxpayers that allows the public
to see their returns. Were they taxable entities, the publicity function
of taxpaying would no longer provide any regulation.
At the same time, the government has managed to find ways to
limit managerial power without taxing tax-exempt organizations.
Tax law does not constrain their ability to accumulate capital.2 16 But
once they have accumulated capital, tax-exempt organizations face
significant limitations on how they can use that money. 217 Their
earnings cannot inure to the benefit of a shareholder or other
But that is not the only limitation tax-exempt
individual. 218
To maintain its
organizations face on the use of their money.
qualification as tax-exempt, an organization must primarily pursue
its qualifying exempt purpose. 2 19 To the extent more than an
insubstantial part of its activities do not further its exempt purpose,
the tax-exempt organization no longer qualifies for exemption. 220
While the law does not define at what point an activity passes from
insubstantial to substantial, 221 if a tax-exempt organization spends
too large a percentage of its total expenditures on activities unrelated
to its exempt purpose, courts view it as crossing that line. 222 While
the regulatory role of -the tax law is different for tax-exempt
organizations than it is for for-profit corporations, the tax regime is
just as capable of preventing tax-exempt organizations from overly
enriching stakeholders or spending money to consolidate power.
In addition to these explicit constraints on the way tax-exempt
organizations can use their money, the IRS has attempted to overlay

215. I.R.C. § 6104(d)(1). Not all tax-exempt organizations are subject to this
disclosure requirement, though: the tax law exempts churches and their
"integrated auxiliaries" from the obligation to file information returns and also
provides a de minimis exemption for organizations with annual gross receipts of
not more than $5,000. Id. § 6033(a)(3)(A).
216. Donald L. Sharpe, Unfair Business Competition and the Tax on Income
Destined for Charity:Forty-Six Years Later, 3 FLA. TAX REV. 367, 386 (1996).
217. See id.
218. Treas. Reg. § 1.501(c)(3)-1(c)(2) (as amended in 2014).
219. Id. § 1.501(c)(3)-1(c)(1).
220. Id. ("An organization will not [qualify as tax-exempt] if more than an
insubstantial part of its activities is not in furtherance of an exempt purpose.").
221. See Samuel D. Brunson, Reigning In Charities: Using an Intermediate
Penalty to Enforce the CampaigningProhibition,8 PITT. TAX REV. 125, 144 (2011)
(stating that although it appears that the line from when an activity passes from
insubstantial to substantial may be within a certain threshold, its exact location
is unclear).
222. See, e.g., Haswell v. United States, 500 F.2d 1133, 1146-47 (Ct. Cl. 1974)
("For an organization that operates on as small a total budget as NARP to devote
so much of its total resources to legislative activities, it fairly can be concluded
that its purposes no longer accord with conceptions traditionally associated with
a common-law charity.").
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soft regulation 223 on top of the formal constraints tax-exempt
organizations face. Informally, the IRS has endorsed a series of best
practices for nonprofit boards. 224
These best practices include
"conflict of interest policies, compensation policies, governing board
review of agents' actions, independent review of financial statements,
investment policies, governing board minutes, . . . records retention
policies," and board composition. 225
Encouraging-or even
mandating 226-these kinds of best-governance practices may, in fact,
represent better regulation than merely limiting the amount of assets
over which a board has power. That limitation does not tell boards
what they should or should not do. It merely limits their ability to
act, whether their actions would have been beneficial or detrimental
to society.
If the purpose of the corporate income tax is to reach shareholder
income and to regulate corporations, tax-exempt organizations do not
belong in the tax base. They have no shareholders, and they are
subject to state and federal regulation that does not rely on their
paying taxes. Importantly, if they do not belong in the tax base in the
first place, exempting them does not represent a subsidy. Rather, it
recognizes that there is no economic or regulatory case to be made for
taxing tax-exempt organizations. Although the route we use to
conclude that tax exemption does not represent a subsidy differs from
the route Professor Bittker took, we find it inarguable that he was
correct: the tax exemption is not a subsidy.
2.

But What About UBIT?

Although taxing tax-exempt organizations does not comport with
the policy goals that underlie corporate taxation, tax-exempt
organizations are not always free from paying income tax.
Specifically, tax-exempt organizations are subject to the unrelated
business income tax ("UBIT"), which functions in many ways as a
227
shadow corporate income tax.

Prior to 1950, when Congress enacted the UBIT, a for-profit
business could entirely escape taxation if it met two criteria. 228 First,

223. See Thomas 0. McGarity, Some Thoughts on "Deossifying" the
Rulemaking Process, 41 DuKE L.J. 1385, 1441 (1992) (stating that informal rule
making (soft regulation) allows regulators to sidestep the formal regulatory
process, and includes things like "policy statements, interpretive rules, and
guidance documents").

224. Leff, supra note 210, at 736.
225. Id.
226. Id. at 781 (posing the question of whether mandating an organization to
conform to a best practice is within the IRS's authority under current law).

227. Henry B. Hansmann, Unfair Competition and the Unrelated Business
Income Tax, 75 VA. L. REV. 605, 605 (1989).
228.

Samuel D. Brunson, RepatriatingTax-Exempt Investments: Tax Havens,

Blocker Corporations,and Unrelated Debt-FinancedIncome, 106 Nw. U. L. REV.
225, 230 (2012).
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a tax-exempt organization had to own the for-profit business. 22 9
Second, the tax-exempt organization had to use revenue from the forprofit business exclusively to support its exempt purposes. 230 In 1940,
for example, several individuals donated the stock of C.F. Mueller
Company, the largest macaroni manufacturer in the United States at
the time, to New York University ("NYU"). 23 1 C.F. Mueller was
clearly a for-profit entity, but it claimed that it was operated for a
charitable purpose because all of its income went to benefit the NYU
School of Law. 2 32
Thus, the company claimed it qualified for
exemption from tax.2 3 3 The court agreed that, under pre-1950 law,
because its purpose was not "to benefit, directly or indirectly, private
interest," C.F. Mueller met the requirements for tax exemption. 234
Not only was this conclusion correct under the law at the time
but it was probably also correct from a policy perspective. Because
the sole shareholder of the company was exempt from taxation, taxing
the C.F. Mueller Company did not reach the otherwise-taxable
income of shareholders. 2 35 Given the limitations the board faced on
what to do with the company's money, taxing C.F. Mueller would have
done little to regulate the board. Although the court did not refer to
these fundamental policies of the corporate income tax, it did hold
that, from a policy perspective, "the benefit from revenue is
outweighed by the benefit to the general public welfare gained
through the encouragement of charity." 236
The UBIT essentially reverses the assumption that if an entity's
revenue exclusively benefits a tax-exempt organization, the entity's
income should also be exempt from taxation. 237 Under the UBIT, taxexempt organizations pay taxes at their corporate income tax rate on
any unrelated business taxable income they earn. 238 "Unrelated
business taxable income," in turn, is the net income earned by a taxexempt organization from any trade or business in which it engages
that is not substantially related to its exempt purpose. 239 In other
words, had the UBIT been existed in 1940, NYU would have paid
income tax on macaroni that it sold.
The existence of the UBIT would seem to counter our argument
that tax-exempt organizations do not meet the criteria for inclusion

229.
230.
231.

Id.
Id.
Id.

232. C.F. Mueller Co. v. Comm'r, 190 F.2d 120, 120-21 (3d Cir. 1951).
233.
234.
235.

Id. at 121.
Id. at 122.
See id. at 121-22.

236. Id. at 122.
237. See Brunson, supra note 228.
238. I.R.C. § 511(a) (2012). The one exception is exempt trusts, which pay
taxes on their unrelated business taxable income at trust, not corporate, rates.
Id. § 511(b).
239. Id. §§ 512(a), 513(a).
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in the tax base. After all, with the UBIT, Congress intentionally
targeted certain income of tax-exempt organizations in spite of the
lack of shareholders or regulatory aims. 240 However, the history of
the UBIT does not bear out claims that it establishes or represents an
alternative policy basis for imposing the corporate income tax. 24 1
Upon enacting the UBIT, Congress explained that "[t]he problem at
which the tax on unrelated business income is directed here is
primarily that of unfair competition." 242 Essentially, Congress saw
tax-exempt organizations (such as NYU) entering into direct
competition with for-profit endeavors. 243
But tax-exempt
organizations, it believed, had a distinct advantage in that
competition: they could reinvest all of their income into expansion,
while their for-profit. (and taxable) competitors could only expand
using their after-tax profits. 244 The issue Congress had was not
subsidy but concern that tax-exempt organizations would eventually
use their competitive advantage to "purchase a large portion of their
competitors or drive them into bankruptcy." 245
The UBIT, then, was not intended to tax tax-exempt
organizations more accurately. Rather, it was meant to ensure that
for-profit businesses had a level field on which they could compete
with tax-exempt organizations' for-profit endeavors.
Because
Congress intended the UBIT to serve as a defense, its existence does
not speak to the purpose of the corporate income tax and does not
weigh against our analysis that tax-exempt organizations do not
belong in the tax base.
If § 501(c)(3) does not lead to the logical conclusion that the
entities should be part of the tax base, then the conclusions of the Bob
Jones decision do not necessarily follow. For the fundamental public
policy doctrine to apply as the Supreme Court intended, § 501(c)(3)
needs to be a subsidy, which it is not. Therefore, in order for the Bob
Jones fundamental public policy doctrine to apply, § 170 needs to be
a subsidy and mapped onto § 501(c)(3).
IV. THE DEDUCTIBILITY OF CHARITABLE DONATIONS

The modern personal income tax was enacted in 1913. The initial
draft of the income tax proposed a charitable deduction. 246 During
240. See Sharpe, supra note 216, at 383-84.

241. See id. at 385-98 (stating that Congress was motivated to pass the UBIT
to decrease unfair competition and was unconcerned about tax-exempt
organizations competing unfairly in aspects of real estate and investments).
242. H.R. REP. No. 81-2319, at 36 (1950).
243. Id.; see, e.g., C.F. Mueller Co. v. Comm'r., 190 F.2d 120 (3d Cir. 1951)
(finding that a for-profit company qualified as a tax-exempt organization because
profits went to NYU, a tax-exempt organization).
244. H.R. REP. No. 81-2319, at 36.
245. Brunson, supra note 228, at 232.
246. Ellen P. Aprill, Churches, Politics and the Charitable Contribution
Deduction, 42 B.C. L. REV. 843, 848 (2000) ("Although an attempt to enact a
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the debate over the definition of the base of net income, Congressman
John Jacobs Rogers, a Massachusetts Republican, presented an
amendment for a "deduction for gifts made by individuals to
charitable, benevolent and religious societies." 247 Representative
Rogers advocated for the exemption because without it, charitable
contributions would lessen: "[I]t is desirable that there should be no
curtailment imposed by this act upon the benevolent members of the
community." 248 The amendment was not adopted, albeit without
debate. 249
The failure to adopt a charitable deduction in the Revenue Act of
1913 was not accidental. In the 1894 Act, there was a deduction for
charitable contributions made by corporations. 2 50 Although there was
an affirmative choice made to not include the deduction, 25 1 it is hard
to make any definite conclusion about whether the failure to include
a charitable deduction in 1913 was a rejection of Representative
Rogers's exclusion-based theory of the deduction or a rejection of the
impact on charity. For example, a small pool of taxpayers with a top
rate of 7% would not have necessarily had an impact on charitable
giving.
To the extent that either or neither rationale was accurate, the
charitable deduction was put into the Code a scant four years later in
1917.252 After the First World War, Congress increased tax rates
(with a top rate of 52%) through the War Revenue Act of 1917.253
Charities feared that the increase in tax burden would lessen
discretionary dollars, causing a second-order problem of funding
charities. 254 Without private funding of charities, people worried that
the government would either have to provide those services or

deduction for gifts to 'religious, charitable, scientific, or educational' institutions
in 1913 was unsuccessful."). On the 1913 effort, see J. S. SEIDMAN, SEIDMAN'S
LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE FEDERAL INCOME TAX LAWS, 1938-1861, at 944-45
(1938).
247. 50 CONG. REC. 1259 (1913) (statement of Rep. Rogers); see also Carol A.
Jones, Tax Law-Hernandez v. Commissioner: The Supreme Court Forces A
Square Peg into A Round Hole, 25 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 917, 924 (1990).
248. 50 CONG. REc. 1259 (statement of Rep. Rogers).
249. See id.
250. Revenue Act of 1894, ch. 349, § 32, 28 Stat. 509, 556. This tax was
declared unconstitutional in Pollock v. Farmers' Loan & Trust Co., 157 U.S. 429,
583 (1895).
251.

50 CONG. REC. 1259.

252. War Revenue Act of 1917, ch. 63, § 1201(2), 40 Stat. 300, 330.
253. See id. at 300-01 (explaining that "in addition to the normal tax," which
is capped at 50% percent for individuals, there would be an additional 2% tax on
all income).
254. STAFF OF THE JOINT COMM. ON TAXATION, PRESENT LAw AND BACKGROUND
RELATING To THE FEDERAL TAX TREATMENT OF CHARITABLE CONTRIBUTIONS 6

(Feb. 2013); Stanley S. Surrey, The Federal Income Tax Base for Individuals, 58
COLUM. L. REV. 815, 825 (1958).
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subsidize the organizations. 25 5 To do so would have required further
increasing taxes. This rather pragmatic and unromantic view of
charity through the war lens enabled legislation to pass that failed in
1913.256
To avoid the impact on charities, proposals were made to permit
a deduction for contributions to charities by individuals. Senator
Harry F. Hollis proposed an amendment to the 1917 Act providing for
an initial 20% deduction for charitable contributions. 2 57 Senator
Hollis focused, rightly, on the potential impact of an income tax on
the charitable sector.
Once again, although inartfully framed, there was a question of
whether the deduction was an exclusion from income or a subsidy.
On one hand, the advocate for the amendment, Senator Hollis,
justified the amendment by saying, "Look at it in this way: For every
dollar that a man contributes to these public charities, educational,
scientific, or otherwise, the public gets 100 per cent: it is all devoted
to that purpose." 258 Senator Hollis seems to be making an argument
about the appropriate base argument here.
On the other hand, the majority of the discussion surrounding
the adoption on the deduction was a subsidy question. For example,
former President Taft in written testimony questioned the viability of
the Hampton Institute without a deduction for charitable
contributions. 259 At the time, Senators recognized that they created
a welfare state through prior governance. 260 Senator Hollis stated,
"Now, when war comes,... that will be the first place where wealthy
men will be tempted to economize, namely, in donations to charity." 261
It was not just the concern of Senator Hollis to sway the Senate.
There was much public pressure in newspaper editorials. 262 The
editorial staff of the Washington Post wrote,
If the Government takes all, or nearly all, of one's disposable or
surplus income, it must undertake the responsibility for
spending it and it must then support those works of charity and
mercy and all the educational and religious works in this

255.

90 CONG. REC. 4029 (1944) (statement of Rep. Curtis) (questioning if the

worthwhile institutions so that
drafters of the tax code "want to cripple all ...
they must come to the Federal Government for a subsidy").
256. JOSEPH J. THORNDIKE, MAKING THE WORLD SAFE FOR PHILANTHROPY: THE
WARTIME ORIGINS AND PEACETIME DEVELOPMENT OF THE TAX DEDUCTION FOR
CHARITABLE GIVING 6-9 (Apr. 2013) http://www.urban.org/sites/default/files

/thorndike-making-the-world-safe-for-philanthropy.pdf.
257. 55 CONG. REC. 6728 (1917).
258. Id.
259. Id.; see also Aprill, supra note 246, at 849 (noting that institutes of higher
learning were most at risk from the rate increases).

260.
261.

See Thorndike, supra note 256, at 9.
55 CONG. REC. 6728.

262.

See infra notes 263-64 and accompanying text.
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The New York Times stated, "There is a necessary social effect to
the taxation of great income. It diminishes or dries up the springs of
philanthropic eleemosynary and educational life." 2 64
That is not to say that the Hollis view was universal. Frank
Anderson, an economist from Columbia, published a paper in the
Journal of Political Economy discussing how charitable deductions
are overrated. 265 In other words, the decline of charity would, in fact,
provide a boost to government. From Anderson's perspective, the
social value of private charity was highly overrated. 266 He believed
that the only loss is to the ego of the donor. "If [heavy taxation
without a deduction] also cuts down luxurious consumption and
nonessential charities, that is just what furthers the supreme end in
war time." 267

Neither the exclusion from the base nor the antisubsidy views
really gained traction. 268 Rather, a compromise reached at the time
was the enactment of the first charitable exemption. 269 To ensure
that individuals would still be subject to the income tax, the
exemption was capped at 15%. The statute read in part,
Contributions or gifts actually made within the year to
corporations or associations organized and operated exclusively
for religious, charitable, scientific, or educational purposes, or
to societies for the prevention of cruelty to children or animals,
no part of the net income of which inures to the benefit of any
private stockholder or individual, to an amount not in excess of
fifteen per centum of the taxpayer's taxable net income as
computed without the benefit of this paragraph. 270
Since this compromise in 1917, the frame of the charitable
deduction under § 170 has for the most part remained the same. 27 1
263. Opinion, Exempting Charity, WASH. POsT, Aug. 25, 1917, at 6.
264. Opinion, The Conscriptionof Wealth, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 24, 1917, at 6.
265. See Frank F. Anderson, FundamentalFactorsin War Finance, 25 J. POL.
ECON. 857, 873 (1917).
266. See id.
267. Id.; see also BANK ETAL., supra note 190, at 8.
268. 55 CONG. REC. 6728 (1917) (statement of Rep. Hollis) (explaining that
under the subsidy view, if the federal government were to undertake to "support
such institutions ... and the taxes were imposed for the amount, they would only
get [a] percentage . . . [i]nstead of getting the full amount"); id. at 6732
(announcing that Senator Hollis's exclusion from the base proposal failed to pass
in the Senate).

269. Vada Walters Lindsey, The CharitableDeduction: A Historical Review
and a Look to the Future, 81 NEB. L. REV. 1056, 1057 (2003).
270. See War Revenue Act of 1917, ch. 63, § 1201(2), 40 Stat. 300, 330.
271. See Lindsey, supra note 269 (observing that "[a]lthough the basic
premise remains the same, the current statutory scheme has been transformed

from a short statutory provision into a complex set of rules").
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The argument during the 1917 debate framed how the charitable
deduction would be discussed in future modifications. 2 72 First, there
would be limits on the charitable deduction. 273 Second, "healthy
charities were a desirable alternative to big government: if people
didn't want the state to absorb full responsibility for social welfare,
then the tax system must find a way to encourage (or at least not
penalize) charitable giving." 274
In 1924, there was a proposal to create an unlimited deduction
for taxpayers that donated for the prior ten years more than 90% of
their income. 275 This proposal is aligned with the base exclusion
theory of Senator Hollis. 2 7 6 A taxpayer could eliminate all taxable
income through giving. 277
"[T]he Senate Finance Committee
perceived less tax abuse where a taxpayer consistently contributed
large percentages of the taxpayer's taxable income over a long period
of time." 2 7 8 Taxing the same dollar twice in this situation seemed
superfluous. "The history provides that '[t]his provision is designed
substantially to free from income taxation one who is habitually
contributing to benevolent organizations amounts equalling [sic]
virtually his entire income."'2 79 Clearly, by 1924 the

§ 170 deduction

was viewed as a subsidy and not as an exemption from income.
A potential shift loomed in 1944 with the end of World War II and
the need to expand revenues. The rules were modified to introduce
the standard deduction and to limit the deduction to a percent of
adjusted gross income instead of taxable income.2 80
During World War II, the government needed to raise
tremendous amounts of revenue, which it did in part by adding the
middle class to the tax rolls. 2 81 The expansion of the tax system to
the middle claSs 2 82 caused compliance concerns. In order to add the
middle class to the taxpaying world, accommodations had to be made
including withholding and a standard deduction.
272. See id. at 1079 (explaining that "[w]hile many changes [to the 1917 Act]
were modest, the totality of constant modification during the past seventy years
has, in fact, culminated in the complexity of the rules in existence today").
273. Edward A. Zelinsky, Why the Buffett-Gates Giving Pledge Requires
Limitation of the Estate Tax Charitable Deduction, 16 FLA. TAX REV. 393, 399
(2014).
274. BANK ETAL., supra note 190, at 399.
275. Revenue Act of 1924, Pub. L. No. 68-176, 43 Stat. 253.; see also Lindsey,
supra note 269, at 1061.
276. 55 CONG. REC. 6728 (1917).
277. Miranda Perry Fleischer, Generous to a Fault? Fair Shares and
CharitableGiving, 93 MINN. L. REV. 165, 171 n.24 (2008).
278. Lindsey, supranote 269, at 1061.
279. Fleischer, supra note 277.
280. John R. Brooks II, Doing Too Much: The Standard Deduction and the
Conflict Between Progressivity and Simplification, 2 COLUM. J. TAX L. 203, 211
(2011).
281. Id. at 210.
282. Aprill, supra note 246, at 850 ("Between 1939 and 1945, the coverage of
the tax system grew from about 5% to 74% of the population.").
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The standard deduction impact of the charitable deduction was
unknown. Similar to Senator Hollis's discussion in 1917, charities
were concerned that the new standard deduction and withholding
would impact the disposable income of taxpayers. 283 "Lobbyists for
the nonprofit sector insisted that withholding was hurting donations,
as Americans struggled to make gifts from shrunken paychecks." 284
From the charities' point of view, the standard deduction was an
existential threat. 285 "Can it be possible that the master minds
behind the scenes who determine the policy for the Treasury
Department and all other branches of government want to cripple all
of these worth-while institutions so that they must come to the
Federal Government for a subsidy?" 286
Using the same normative frame from 1917, charities challenged
the withholding aspect of the new income tax.287 In order to ease
administration and aid unsophisticated taxpayers' budgeting process,
part of the new tax regime was withholding for taxation. 288 Because
of withholding, paychecks would shrink. The result of the smaller
paycheck would, like in 1917, reduce charitable donations.
It was reported at the time that the withholding regime caused a
drop in donations. 289 The response of a number charities was a
formation of the Council of Taxes and Philanthropy lobby. 290
Charities advocated for a modification of the withholding rules to
allow taxpayers to obtain a credit for charitable contributions against
withholding. 29 1 "Under their plan, taxpayers would be allowed to
adjust their withholding to account for expected charitable
contributions over the course of the year." 292

Representative Carl Curtis, a Republican from Nebraska,
"worried that the bill, when carried into effect, meant that the
individual who gives a portion of his hard-earned money in
contributions would have the same amount of his taxes 'withheld from
his wages as if he had given nothing."' 293 The newly formed lobby
group took a slightly more aggressive tactic, stating that
283. 55 CONG. REC. at 6728 (1917) (statement of Sen. Hollis); see Aprill, supra
note 246, at 850.
284. Thorndike, supra note 256, at 10.
285. Aprill, supra note 246, at 850; see also Thorndike, supra note 256, at 10.
286. 90 CONG. REC. 4029 (1944) (statement of Sen. Curtis).
287. See Aprill, supra note 246, at 851.
288. See, e.g., Thorndike, supranote 256, at 10.
289. Id.

290. According to the Congressional Record, "The United Stewardship
Council, representing 21 denominations and 24,000,000 Protestant Church
members, countless individual churches and clergymen, the Council on Taxes
and Philanthropy, a number of Catholic churches and organizations, the
American Association of Colleges, and innumerable people have protested this
bill." 90 CONG. REC. 1429.
291. Thorndike, supra note 256, at 10.
292. Id.
293. Aprill, supra note 246, at 850-51.
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[i]t is utterly unfair to give a profligate spendthrift who seldom
gives a penny to charity the same credit and tax deduction as
the devout widow or the conscientious contributor who gives a
tithe or sacrificially gives 15 percent or more, in order to share
with those who are less fortunate. 294
Withholding was thought to lessen the absolute dollars available
to charities. 295 In addition to the absolute dollar problem, Senator
Curtis made a double-tax argument, stating that "[t]hey want to
withhold a tax on exempt income that is given to the churches, the
colleges, the hospitals, the orphanages, the Red Cross organizations,
and every other institution that makes life better." 296 This argument

failed to win the day. 2 97 The ease for reporting proved a greater good
than the marginal impact on potential charitable giving. 298
Adding to the concern about absolute dollars available, the new
standard deduction provided a second challenge regarding incentive
for giving. This second challenge to the standard deduction from the
charitable sector was a horizontal equity argument. 299 Taxpayer A
who contributed $X to charity would reduce their income by $X, and
taxpayer B who did not contribute to charity and kept the $X would
still obtain a deduction for $X via the standard deduction.
Both the Congressional Record and contemporaneous newspaper
accounts supported a moral justification for separating the charitable
deduction from the standard deduction. 300 "Just think of it. Under
this proposal, this presumptive deduction, atheists who hate the
church, who do not believe in God, who despise everything the church
is doing, are going to be given credit for having donated to churches
to the extent of 2 1/2 percent of their total income." 301
The horizontal equity argument once again failed. 302 Despite the
lack of economic theories presented at the time, an elasticity of giving
argument carried the day. 3 0 3 The adoptive majority of the Revenue
Act of 1944 believed that contributions were made because the cause

294. Thorndike, supra note 256, at 10 (citing Rev. John Evans, Churches Seek
Amendment to Income Tax Act, CHI. DAILY TRIB., July 31, 1944, at 18).
295. See id.
296. 90 CONG. REC. 4030 (1944) (statement of Sen. Curtis).
297. Aprill, supra note 246, at 851.
298. Id. ("Representative Robertson, for example, responded that although
the members of the committee considered Representative Curtis' viewpoint, they

'found it absolutely impossible to work out this simplification plan on any basis
other than what we [have] used."').

299.
300.

Brooks, supra note 280, at 206 n.10.
90 CONG. REC. 4024; Rev. John Evans, Churches Seek Amendment to

Income Tax Act, CHI. DAILY TRIB., July 31, 1944, at 18.

301.
302.

90 CONG. REC. 4024.
See Aprill, supra note 246, at 867 ("The argument is one of horizontal

equity-that itemizers and nonitemizers are similarly situated and should be

treated similarly.").
303. See id. at 857-58.
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was worthy, not for the income tax deduction. 304 Senator Walter F.
George, a Democrat from Georgia, stated that the "standard
deduction will not remove the tax incentive for persons in the higher
brackets, upon whom the charities depend for contributions in
substantial amounts."3 05
The Revenue Act of 1944 was enacted by Congress and signed
into law by President Roosevelt. 306 The result of the 1944 revision
was an entrenchment of the 1917 positions. Charities were a part of
the fabric of society; and a threat to the charitable deduction or the
amount of dollars available for charitable giving would prove a threat
to the existence of charities. 307 "Charities may have lost this new
legislative battle, but they had not abandoned their tried-and-true
arguments on behalf of the deduction." 308
Until 1986, absent minor changes in the deduction, the charitable
deduction remained essentially the same. 309 Leading up to the 1986
reform, in 1981 Congress experimented with the charitable deduction
by opening it up to nonitemizers. 3 10 At the time, the Joint Committee
on Taxation believed that opening up the deduction to nonitemizers
would increase charitable giving, "thereby providing more funds for
worthwhile nonprofit organizations, many of which provide services
that otherwise might have to be provided by the Federal
Government." 3 11
Polls at the time showed that the deduction was not having very
much effect on giving, but voters liked the deduction. 312 Leading up
to the major reform effort of 1986, with the only clear public
consensus being that the deduction does not affect giving, the
Treasury released a major overhaul of the Code in 1984, commonly
known as Treasury I.313 This plan would have a significant impact on
304. Id. at 851 (citing Rep. Robert Doughton); Thorndike, supra note 256, at
11.
305. 90 CONG. REC. 4704.
306. Thorndike, supra note 256, at 12.
307. See id. at 10.
308. Id. at 12.
309. Zelinsky, supra note 273 ("Thus, almost four decades after the Revenue
Act of 1917 inaugurated the income tax charitable deduction, the 1954 Code both
increased the limits of that deduction and embraced the principle that
individuals' contributions to some donees-initially defined as churches, schools
and hospitals-are subject to higher deduction limits than are contributions to
all other charitable donees.").
310. Economic Recovery Act of 1981, Pub. L. No. 97-34, § 121, 95 Stat. 172,
196; see also Aprill, supra note 246, at 852.
311. STAFF OF THE J. COMM. ON TAXATION, 97TH CONG., GENERAL EXPLANATION
OF THE ECONOMIC RECOVERY TAX ACT OF 1981, at 49 (Joint Comm. Print 1981);

see also Aprill, supra note 246, at 873; Thorndike, supra note 256, at 13.
312. Thorndike, supra note 256, at 13 (finding that 66% of individuals would
not trade the deduction for lower rates and 74% of individuals would not change
their giving if the deduction was abolished, although other polls had less clear
results).
313. Id. at 14.
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charities through: (1) significant rate decreases; (2) a repeal of the
1981 nonitemizer provisions, (3) a limit on the charitable deduction;
and (4) a limitation on the value of contribution appreciated
property.3 14
Ironically, the primary concern of charities was the reduction of
rates. As you will recall, in 1917 and 1944, the argument was the
implementation of tax would impact charitable giving because there
would be less absolute dollars available. 3 15 By 1984, charities argued
that they did not "want to be against lower rates, so we're looking for
alternatives to replace the money we would lose." 3 16 By 1984,
charities believed that the above-the-line deduction for charitable
giving had a positive correlation to the amount given.317
Moreover, by limiting or bringing the deduction below-the-line,
there would be a crowding out of the nonitemizers:
The message that we as a nation will be sending to ourselves
and to successor generations will be that private giving and
volunteering are not, as we have hitherto argued, central to the
kind of society we want to be, but merely a peripheral exercise
in which only a privileged minority of the public participates or
has an interest. 318

Although the message regarding the expendable dollars had
changed, the public subsidy argument remained. "Eventually, [Lee
Cobb, vice president of the U.S. UNICEF Committee] warned, the
social services provided by these nonprofit organizations would suffer
and 'government is going to have to pick up the slack."' 319

Others

made similar arguments that existed in 1917, stating that
"[c]ontributions to charities should not be the tax base to begin
with." 320

The Tax Reform Act of 1986, much like the 1944 Act, relied on
simplicity. The 1986 Act increased the standard deduction (which,
like in 1944, was intended to assume a baseline amount of charitable
contributions), lowered rates, and eliminated the deduction for
nonitemizers. 321 "Simplification and base-broadening were far more
important than incentives for charitable giving." 3 2 2 The 1986 Act
continued the longstanding position that the standard deduction was

314. Id.
315. See id. at 6-7.
316. Anne Swardson, CharitiesOver Tax Reform Barrel, WASH. PosT, Jan. 30,
1985, at A4.
317. See Thorndike, supra note 256, at 14.
318. Richard Lyman, Charity-A Matter of Deduction, N.Y. TIMEs, June 22,
1985, at 27.
319. Thorndike, supra note 256, at 15.
320. Peter Swords, Charity Should Not Begin in Washington, N.Y. TIMES,
Mar. 22, 1985, at A30.
321. Thorndike, supra note 256, at 16-17.
322. Aprill, supra note 246, at 853.
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a substitute for charitable giving at the lower boundary, and the
323
lowering of rates should increase the amount of disposable income.
Since 1986, the charitable deduction under § 170 has continued
to be examined. 324 In 2010, the National Commission on Fiscal
Responsibility and Reform was formed by the President and the
leaders of both parties. 325 The result of the Commission was the
The report proposed replacing the
Bowles-Simpson Report.
charitable deduction for itemizers with a "12% non-refundable tax
credit available to all taxpayers; available above 2% of Adjusted Gross
Income (AGI) floor." 3 2 6 The purpose of the change was a long-term
call "to lower tax rates, broaden the base, simplify the tax code, and
bring down the deficit." 3 2 7 These were the same guiding principles of
the 1986 revisions. 328
The Nobel Prize-winning economist Robert J. Shiller wrote an oped at the time advocating for the charitable deduction. 329 He framed
the deduction not as a "loophole." 330 The fact that the wealthy
disproportionately benefit from the deduction does not matter since
society as a whole benefits. Rather, he believed that income given to
charity should be exempt from the definition of income. 33 1 Moreover,
there is a spillover effect that the tax break "encourages a habit and
a culture of giving." 332 In order to achieve this norm, Professor Shiller
advocated for greater signals for charitable giving. 333 "Instead of
curtailing the charitable deduction, we should be aiming to make it
an even bigger part of our culture." 334 He advocated similar historic
323. Lilian V. Faulhaber, The Hidden Limits of the CharitableDeduction:An
Introduction to Hypersalience, 92 B.U. L. REV. 1307, 1321-22, 1321-22 n.70
(2012) ("The deduction's current structure raises questions about the
effectiveness of the standard deduction at achieving this purpose. Such concerns
arise because, in reality, a taxpayer's choice to itemize is largely attributable to
other deductions-such as the home mortgage interest deduction and the state
and local tax deduction-than to the number of donations a taxpayer makes."
(citing David M. Schizer, Subsidizing Charitable Contributions: Incentives,
Information, and the Private Pursuit of Public Goals, 62 TAX L. REV. 221, 238
(2009))).
324. See, e.g., Thorndike, supra note 256, at 17-18.
325.

NAT'L COMM'N ON FIscAL RESPONSIBILITY

& REFORM,

THE MOMENT OF

https://permanent.access.gpo.gov/gpol606
(2010),
6
TRUTH
/TheMomentofTruthl2_1_2010.pdf.
326. Id. at 31.
327. Id. at 12.
328. Aprill, supra note 246, at 853.
329. Robert J. Shiller, Please Don't Mess with the CharitableDeduction, N.Y.
15, 2012), http://www.nytimes.com/2012/12/16/business/the
(Dec.
TIMES
-charitable-deduction-and-why-it-needs-to-stay.html.
330. Id.
331. Id.

332. Id.
333. Id.
334. Id. ("Using data from Giving USA, we see that total individual giving in
the United States-including giving by those who don't declare it on their tax
returns-was only 1.9 percent of disposable personal income in 2011. Compare
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proposals, such as making the deduction available for nonitemizers
as in 1981 or, as in 1944, allowing a credit on the withholding tax
calculation for the charitable deduction "so we don't have to go
through the nuisance of collecting information and detailing it at tax
time." 335

These themes were then picked up in hearings held in 2011 by
the Senate Committee on Finance. 336 In the hearings, a redux of the
1913, 1917, 1944, and 1986 hearings happened. The disposableincome and the standard-deduction-as-a-subsidy arguments were
once again made. Senator Hatch explained that "from my perspective
the tax reform options being discussed today are options that target
charitable giving concocted by those who, hungry for more taxpayer
dollars to finance reckless government spending, are now casting
their sights on the already depleted resources of charities and
churches."337
By 2011, robust economic literature existed discussing the
elasticity of the charitable deduction. 338 Economists argued that the
large loss of federal revenue compared to a small increase of
charitable giving. 339 Senator Hatch disagreed, stating, "Taxpayers
who receive little or no additional tax benefit for giving to their church
or charity give faithfully anyway." 340 Although Senator Hatch
dismissed the economists, his rhetoric was closer to Professor Shiller,
who believes that the income donated to charity was not really part
of the taxable income calculation. 341
Currently, tax simplification and rate reduction is back on the
table. In order to simplify tax returns, there are proposals to raise
Both
the standard deduction and cap itemized deductions. 342
that with the traditional Christian, Jewish and Islamic standards of 10
percent!").
335. Id.
336. Tax Reform Options:Incentives for CharitableGiving: HearingBefore the
S. Comm. on Fin., 112th Cong. (2011).
337. Id. at 3 (statement of Sen. Orrin Hatch, Ranking Member, S. Comm. on
Fin.).
338. See, e.g., Miranda Perry Fleischer, Equality of Opportunity and the
Charitable Tax Subsidies, 91 B.U. L. REV. 601, 662 (2011).
339. William A. Drennan, Where Generosity and Pride Abide: Charitable
Naming Rights, 80 U. CIN. L. REV. 45, 86-87 (2011) (explaining that a decline in
charitable giving can lead to an increase in federal revenue because taxpayers
cannot deduct the charitable donation).
340. Tax Reform Options:Incentives for CharitableGiving: HearingBefore the
S. Comm. on Fin., supra note 336, at 4 (statement of Sen. Orrin Hatch, Ranking
Member, S. Comm. on Fin.).
341. Compare id. ("Every charitable gift has one thing in common: the donor
is always left worse off financially. But society is made better."), with Shiller,
supra note 329 ("Income that is freely given away should not even be considered
as taxable income.").
342. Charles Delafuente, How a Tax Code Overhaul May Affect You, N.Y.
TIMEs (Feb. 16, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/02/16/business/yourtaxes
/how-a-tax-code-overhaul-may-affect-you.html?mcubz=O.
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President Trump and the Republican Party's "A Better Way" tax plan
include these constant modification techniques. 343 Much like the
historic arguments, the concern of charities on the impact of either
the substitution problem-e.g., the standard deduction-impacts
charitable giving. "Of course, many advisers will say that tax
incentives are not the only reason people give to charity. But tax
incentives factor in at some level, and are generally credited with
344
making Americans the most philanthropic people in the world."

V. A BETTER WAY TO DEAL WITH VIOLATIONS OF FUNDAMENTAL
PUBLIC POLICY

As we discussed earlier, the Supreme Court's decision in Bob
Jones was almost certainly wrong, as a matter of both law and tax
policy. That said, it was also almost certainly necessary. It was
important that schools not undercut the civil rights first granted by
Brown then augmented through decades of civil rights legislation.
Wrong or not, while the Code does not even hint at the idea of a
fundamental public policy requirement for tax exemption, 345 the idea
that there is a common law of tax, which overlays the Code, is well
accepted. And the fundamental public policy rule, in spite of its lack
of clarity and underenforcement, has become a central part of the law
of tax-exempt organizations.
As a result of its centrality and the intuitive sense that the
government should not subsidize certain bad behavior, we do not
argue that the fundamental public policy rule should be jettisoned. It
serves a valuable purpose, both as a signal of what is acceptable and
as an incentive for tax-exempt organizations to do the right thing.
At the same time, we believe that the fundamental public policy
As we have
requirement is currently implemented poorly.
demonstrated, tax exemption is not a subsidy for public charities.
Rather, it recognizes the fact that, both historically and as a matter
of policy, they do not belong in the tax base. Rather than use the
fundamental public policy rule to disqualify entities that would
otherwise qualify as tax exempt, we believe that the fundamental
public policy test should be applied to disqualify the deduction of
donations to tax-exempt organizations that violate fundamental
public policy. 34 6 Disqualifying deductions, rather than exemptions,
343. Id.; BETTER.GOP, A BETTER WAY OUR VISION FOR A CONFIDENT AMERICA:
TAx 18, 20 (2016), http://abetterway.speaker.gov/_assets/pdflABetterWay-Tax
-PolicyPaper.pdf.
344. Paul Sullivan, Trump's Changes to the Tax Codes May Encourage
Dynastic Wealth, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 11, 2016), https://www.nytimes.com/2016
/11/12/your-money/trump-changes-tax-codes-may-encourage-dynastic-wealth
.html? r=0.
345. Bob Jones Univ. v. United States, 461 U.S. 574, 613 (1983).
346. We considered recommending the elimination of the deduction for
charitable donations and replacing it with a matching grant at the government
level. Under a matching grant program, donors would not get a deduction for
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will make it easier for the IRS to enforce fundamental public policy,
will provide better leverage for encouraging tax-exempt organizations
to act in socially-acceptable ways, corresponds better with tax policy,
and will allow tax-exempt organizations to give voice to unpopular
minority opinions.
A.

On Underenforcement

As we have demonstrated in a previous article, since the IRS
adopted the fundamental public policy rule, it has used the rule
almost exclusively to disqualify racially discriminatory private
Courts have similarly been hesitant to apply the
schools. 347
fundamental public policy rule. 348 Even where an organization would
clearly violate a fundamental public policy, courts and the IRS tend
to use that only as an ancillary reason for denying or revoking an
organization's exemption, not as the primary reason. 349
There may be practical reasons for their not using the
fundamental public policy rule, of course. The precise contours of the
rule are far from clear. While a private school discriminating on the
basis of race clearly violates fundamental public policy, 350 the
Supreme Court has not defined what else qualifies as a fundamental
public policy. 351 Rather, it instructed the IRS to be cautious and only
apply the fundamental public policy rule to disqualify an organization
where "there can be no doubt that the activity involved is contrary to
a fundamental public policy." 352
With the mandate that the fundamental public policy rule only
be invoked when an activity clearly violates a fundamental public
policy, combined with uncertainty over what constitutes a
fundamental public policy, it makes sense that the IRS and other
courts would avoid using the rule when possible. But there is an
additional possibility for why they would avoid using the fundamental

their charitable donations. Rather, a charity would send the government a list
of donations it had received, and the government would provide it with an
Great Britain has
additional amount based on the amount of donations.
implemented this kind of matching grant system. Adam Chodorow, Charity with
Chinese Characteristics,30 UCLA PAC. BASIN L.J. 1, 24 n.142 (2012). Ultimately,
we decided that the question of how to structure a charitable subsidy was beyond
the scope of this article, so for purposes of discussion, we assume the current
charitable deduction. We do not mean to assert that deductibility is the only, or
even the best, way to subsidize charity, and certainly our proposal could be
applied to a matching grant system or other style of charitable subsidy.
347. Brunson & Herzig, supra note 4, at 1187.
348. Id. at 1192.
349. Id. at 1191.
350. See Bob Jones, 461 U.S. at 595.
351. Brunson & Herzig, supra note 4.
352. Bob Jones, 461 U.S. at 592.
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public policy rule: as a practical matter, disqualification would end
the existence of the tax-exempt organization. 3 5 3
That kind of penalty-an effective organizational death
penalty-may be steeper than is warranted. Even an organization
that has policies that society finds opprobrious may also produce
positive externalities. As a society, we may prefer to nudge the
organization into giving up its bad behavior rather than shoving it to
its end. 354

Disallowing a deduction for donations to the organization, by
contrast, has less lethal consequences. Because charitable donations
are economically elastic, 3 55 loss of deductibility will reduce the
And the reduced
donations that the organization will receive.
donations will negatively impact the organization's ability to both
pursue its exempt purpose and continue violating public policy. But
the organization will be able to continue operating and will have the
ability to align its actions with public policy. This, counterintuitively,
may provide incentive for the IRS to actually use the fundamental
public policy rule more often and more effectively.
B.
It Is Not Clear That the FundamentalPublic Policy Is Efficient
in EncouragingGood Behavior
Even if the IRS underenforces the fundamental public policy rule,
the public may justifiably view the rule as a way to encourage taxexempt organizations to give up bad behavior. There is no evidence,
however, that it does so, much less that the threat of loss of exemption
is the most effective way to effect that change. In fact, there is
significant anecdotal evidence that the fundamental public policy rule
is ineffective.
The Bob Jones case clarified that the fundamental public policy
rule could constitutionally apply even to religious universities,
making Bob Jones University an important example of the power of
the fundamental public policy rule. But the Supreme Court's decision
in Bob Jones did not effect change in the university's policies. Even
after the Supreme Court ruled in 1983 that Bob Jones University's
ban on interracial relationships violated fundamental public policy,
and even after the university definitively lost its tax exemption, it did
356
not change its policy.

353. Cf. Brunson, supra note 94 (explaining that the IRS does not strictly
enforce prohibition on campaigning by public charities because public charities
may cease to operate to avoid tax liability).
354. Id. at 155 (explaining that the IRS needs tools to nudge public charities
toward compliance with campaigning rules rather than the current severe
penalties for noncompliance that may end public charities).
355. See Fleischer, supranote 338.
356. Bob Jones, 461 U.S. at 595; see Jim Davenport, University Surprised by
Lifting of Ban, WASH. POST (Mar. 5, 2000), http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp
-srv/WPcapl2000-03/05/096r-030500-idx.html.
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In fact, the university's ban on interracial relationships outlived
the Supreme Court's decision by almost two decades. 357 In March of
2000, Bob Jones III, the then-president of Bob Jones University, went
on Larry King Live and announced that he was lifting the halfcentury-old ban. 3 5 8 The university's decision to lift the ban does not
appear to have any relation to its lack of tax-exempt status. Rather,
the university president said that he eliminated the ban as a result
of the national outcry and scrutiny the university faced when
presidential candidate George W. Bush made a campaign stop
there. 359 There is no reason to believe that President Jones III was
disingenuous in explaining why he ended the ban: even today, more
than fifteen years after it dropped its racial ban (and thus no longer
violates a fundamental public policy), Bob Jones University is still not
tax exempt.3 60
On the margins, at least, the threat of losing-or even the loss
of-tax-exempt status does not necessarily cause a tax-exempt
organization to change its bad behavior. But, as Bob Jones University
demonstrates, public pressure can change behavior that violates
fundamental public policy. The power of public pressure can also be
demonstrated by the experience of the Mormon church. Though its
origins are not entirely clear, at some point, the Mormon church
prohibited anybody of African descent from holding the church's
priesthood or participating in temple ceremonies. 361 In 1978, the
Mormon church reversed its stance, eliminating any religious racial
bans. 362

A popular narrative says that the church changed its position out
of fear of losing its tax-exempt status. 363 That is unlikely for a
number of reasons. True, the IRS had introduced the fundamental
357.
358.

Bob Jones, 461 U.S. at 595.
Davenport, supra note 356.

359. Id.
360. See, e.g., President's Society, BOB JONES U., https://bjualumni.com
/presidents-society/ (last visited Dec. 14, 2017) ("Member-qualifying gifts can be
made at one time or throughout BJU's fiscal year-June 1 through May 31-to
any of the following three tax-deductible funds as wells [sic] as any non-taxdeductible donations to Bob Jones University.").
Moreover, a search on
Guidestar.org for "Bob Jones University" does not bring up the university itself.
Bob Jones University does have some affiliated tax-exempt scholarship and other
funds, but the university itself does not seem to have ever renewed its pursuit for
tax exemption.
361. See John G. Turner, Why Race Is Still a Problem for Mormons, N.Y.
TIMES (Aug. 18, 2012), http://www.nytimes.com/2012/08/19/opinion/sunday
/racism-and-the-mormon-church.html?mcubz=0.

362.

Id.

363. See, e.g., Lance Gurwell, Critics Still Question 'Revelation' on Blacks,
CHI. TRIB. (Jun. 2, 1988), http://articles.chicagotribune.com/1988-06-02/news
/8801040230 1president-spencer-w-kimball-church-spokesman-jerry-cahill
-mormon-church ("[C]ritics say . . that the Mormon church, the fastest growing
mainstream church in the U.S., stood to lose its tax-exempt status for
discriminating against blacks.").
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public policy rule in 1971, and that rule clearly disallowed racial
discrimination. 364 But it was not until five years after the Mormon
church's change that the Supreme Court held that a school's religious
beliefs did not shield it from the necessity of complying with the
365
fundamental public policy rule.

In addition, even when it happened, the Supreme Court's ruling
applied specifically to religious educational institutions. 366 In the
nearly fifty years since the IRS introduced the fundamental public
policy rule, it has almost exclusively used the rule to disallow the
exemptions of racially discriminatory educational institutions. 36 7 In
fact, the Free Exercise Clause of the Constitution probably would
present a significant obstacle to the IRS from revoking a church's tax
exemption. 368
Why, then, would the Mormon church change its position on its
racial restrictions?
For much the same reason as Bob Jones
University eventually did: immense public pressure. As the civil
rights movement gained traction in the 1960s, the Mormon church
faced immense criticism for its racist policy from liberal Christianity,
the Utah branch of the NAACP, journalists, and even some prominent
Mormons. 369 Opponents of the ban also targeted Brigham Young
University ("BYU"), the Mormon church's flagship school. 370 When
BYU athletes played other schools, opposing players often refused to
play or wore black armbands in protest. 37 1 Stanford and the
University of Washington severed their athletic relations with BYU
entirely. 372 Still, in spite of the pressure, the racial ban survived the
decade. 373

&

364. Brunson & Herzig, supranote 4, at 1190.
365. Bob Jones Univ. v. United States, 461 U.S. 574, 604 (1983). ("That
governmental interest [in eradicating racial discrimination in education]
substantially outweighs whatever burden denial of tax benefits places on
petitioners' exercise of their religious beliefs.").
366. Id.
367. See Brunson & Herzig, supra note 4, at 1201-02.
368. See id.; Ira C. Lupu & Robert W. Tuttle, The Mystery of Unanimity, in
Hosanna-Tabor Evangelical Lutheran Church & School v. EEOC, 20 LEWIS
CLARK L. REV. 1265, 1306 n.204 (2017) ("We are by no means recommending a
revocation of tax-exempt status for entities that impose gender-based restrictions

on ordination, and we think that such a move would indeed raise serious
constitutional questions.").
369. Arman L. Mauss, The Fading of the Pharaoh'sCurse: The Decline and
Fall of the PriesthoodBan Against Blacks in the Mormon Church, 14 DIALOGUE:
J. MORMON THOUGHT 10, 14-15 (1981).

370. Edward L. Kimball, Spencer W. Kimball and the Revelation on
Priesthood,47 BYU STUD. 5, 26 (2008).
371.

372.
373.
Church
outside

Id.
Id.; Mauss, supra note 369, at 18.
Mauss, supra note 369, at 18 ("As the end of the decade approached, the
was beginning to appear unassailable and impervious to all forms of
pressure.").
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Though the policy survived into the 1970s, the Mormon church
continued to feel outside pressure to do away with it. When it built a
church building in Manhattan, it faced scrutiny by African American
community members and members of the city planning
commission. 3 74 The Mormon Tabernacle Choir had to cancel a New
England tour because of protests by black clergy in the area. 37 5 Even
its relationship with the Boy Scouts of America put pressure on the
church to change its policy. 3 76
In addition, the church began to face significant internal and
international pressure. Year after year, Mormon leaders received
letters from would-be converts in Nigeria and Ghana asking for
missionaries and asking how to respond to charges of institutional
racism. 377 An attorney in Costa Rica sued, trying to disenfranchise
the Mormon church for violating Costa Rican laws that prohibited
racial discrimination. 3 7 8 And the ban began to create administrative
problems for the Mormon church's expansion in Brazil, which had
become a growth center for Mormons. 379
In response to these internal and external, domestic and foreign,
pressures, in 1978, the Mormon church relented. 380 It abandoned a
policy that almost certainly violated a fundamental public policy, but
it did so as a result of non-tax pressure. In fact, there is no reason to
believe that the threat of losing its tax exemption would have been
possible, much less important, to causing the Mormon church to
change its policies.
That is not to say that the fundamental public policy doctrine has
no persuasive power. But it is not clear that threatening to revoke an
organization's tax-exempt status is the best way to put pressure on
bad tax-exempt actors.
C.

Subsidies for Governance

Subsidies to tax-exempt organizations provide an important
governance function: they encourage tax-exempt organizations to
produce positive externalities. 381 They can also serve to discourage
tax-exempt organizations from engaging in harmful behavior,

374. Id. at 20.
375. Id.
376. See id.
377. Kimball, supra note 370, at 32.
378. Id. at 42.
379. See Mauss, supranote 369, at 24-25.
380. See Kimball, supra note 370, at 5.
381. David M. Schizer, Subsidies and Nonprofit Governance: Comparing the
CharitableDeduction with the Exemption for Endowment Income 3 (Ctr. for Law
& Econ. Studies, Columbia Univ. Sch. of Law, Working Paper No. 558, 2017),
https://papers.ssrn.comlsol3/papers2.cfm?abstractid=2916882.
A positive
externality results when an actor cannot fully internalize the positive returns of
her actions, and a third party also benefits from those actions.
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including the violation of fundamental public policy. 382 Thus, the
threat of losing a subsidy should prevent tax-exempt organizations
from violating fundamental public policy.
In analyzing the role of subsidies, though, it is essential to keep
clear what constitutes a subsidy and what does not. As we have
demonstrated, the exemption of certain public charities is not a
subsidy to those charities. Rather, they are exempt from the
corporate income tax because they do not belong in the tax base. 383
The justifications for the corporate income tax do not apply, because
taxing them does not represent a substitute for taxing individual
income, and there are other, better ways that tax law can prevent
managers from accumulating money and power. 384
This does not mean that any and all organizations can be exempt
from taxation provided that their assets and income do not inure to
the benefit of any individual.
Section 501(c)(3) includes other
requirements, specifically that tax-exempt organizations must fulfill
one or more of an enumerated set of charitable purposes. 385 This
exempt-purpose requirement, combined with the unrelated business
income tax, works to prevent organizations that belong in the
corporate income tax base from avoiding tax.
The exempt-purpose requirement does not always work
flawlessly, though. The IRS is famously underfunded 386 and cannot
possibly do an in-depth review of each of the 101,962 applications for
exemption that it processed in 2015,387 much less closely monitor the
more than one million tax-exempt organizations that file returns
every year. 388 Sometimes, it may mistakenly grant a tax exemption
to an organization that should not qualify. 389

382.

Violating a fundamental public policy is not the only behavior that

regulators can use the tax law to prevent. The same justification for regulating

fundamental public policy through the tax law could also justify, for example, the
prohibition on supporting or opposing candidates for office. I.R.C. § 501(c)(3)
(2012). The same analysis we perform with respect to the fundamental public
policy doctrine may also apply to other regulatory requirements imposed on taxexempt organizations.

383. Supra Subpart III.C.1.
384. Id.
385. Nikki Usher & Michelle D. Layser, The Quest to Save Journalism: A
Legal Analysis of New Models for Newspapers from Nonprofit Tax-Exempt
Organizations to L3Cs, 2010 UTAH L. REv. 1315, 1332 (2010).
386. Francine J. Lipman, Access to Tax InJustice, 40 PEPP. L. REV. 1173, 1208
(2013).
387. IRS, 2015 DATA BOOK 57 (2016), https://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-soi
/15databk.pdf.
388. Paul Arnsberger, Nonprofit Charitable Organizations and DonorAdvised Funds, 2012, 35 SOI BULLETIN 173, 173 (Winter 2016),
https://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-soi/16winbul.pdf.
389. That may explain why the IRS has granted tax-exempt status to at least
four white nationalist groups over the last decade. Michael Kunzelman, White
NationalistsRaise Millions with Tax-Exempt Charities,ASSOCIATED PRESS (Dec.
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Organizations can erroneously qualify as tax exempt. And where
they do, the IRS should revoke their exemptions. It should not do so,
though, because they violate a fundamental public policy but because,
unlike qualifying charities, they belong in the tax base. As we have
demonstrated earlier, if an organization does not belong in the tax
base, it is not being subsidized by the government or by taxpayers.
Thus, revoking its exemption because it violates the fundamental
public policy rule misclassifies an organization.
Just because an organization does not fit in the tax base does not
mean that it merits governmental subsidy, though. In fact, in its Bob
Jones University v. United StateS390 decision, the Fourth Circuit
explicitly stated that the government had a policy "against
subsidizing racial discrimination in education, public or private." 391
And the Supreme Court has, in a nontax context, pointed out that,
while the Constitution may require the state to tolerate certain
violations of public policy, it is not required to provide support for
such violations. 392
Similarly, the government should continue to recognize the
exempt nature of public charities that violate fundamental public
policy. After all, their violation does not change the fact that they
operate primarily for an exempt purpose 393 and that their profits do
not inure to the benefit of individuals.
But the government should not subsidize bad behavior. And
because deductible donations represent a subsidy, 394 eliminating the
deductibility of donations to tax-exempt organizations fits precisely
within the goals of the fundamental public policy rule. To avoid
subsidizing tax-exempt entities that violate fundamental public
policy, then, the IRS should begin disallowing those donors from
395
deducting their donations.

22, 2016), https://www.apnews.com/aelc8l63ac574bb3bdlf3facfca5fb83/White
-nationalists-raise-millions-with-tax-exempt-charities.
390. 639 F.2d 147 (4th Cir. 1980).
391. Id. at 151.
392. Norwood v. Harrison, 413 U.S. 455, 463 (1973) ("That the Constitution
may compel toleration of private discrimination in some circumstances does not
mean that it requires state support for such discrimination.").
393. Again, we want to emphasize that not every organization qualifies as tax
exempt, even if there is no private inurement. Section 501(c)(3) requires that
tax-exempt entities pursue an enumerated exempt purpose. And that exempt

purpose requirement is central to qualification, with or without the fundamental
public policy rule applying at the qualification level. I.R.C. § 501(c)(3) (2012).
394. See supra Part IV.
395. The mechanics of such a disallowance are beyond the scope of this article,
but there are many ways the IRS could implement the disallowance. It could
keep a blacklist of tax-exempt organizations that are not eligible to receive
deductible donations. It could require those organizations to inform donors and
potential donors that their donations are not currently deductible. It could use a
software solution to determine what taxpayers tried to deduct from their
donations.
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One advantage to focusing on the deductibility of donations is
that disallowing the deductibility would not represent a death
sentence to the tax-exempt entity. The entity, in other words, would
have the ability, should it so desire, to come into compliance with
fundamental public policy. Once the tax-exempt entity quits violating
fundamental public policy, it should again receive the subsidies that
other public charities receive.
In other words, focusing the
fundamental public policy rule on the deductibility of donations
allows the fundamental public policy rule to function both as a stick
and as a carrot. It not only punishes bad behavior but it rewards
shedding that bad behavior.
D.

Tax Exemption Provides a Marketplace of Ideas

Tax-exempt organizations play a unique role in American society.
Because they do not distribute profits to shareholders or other
individuals, they can operate outside of the normal market
boundaries that constrain for-profit entities. This frees tax-exempt
organizations to pursue unpopular ideas.
In fact, the IRS recognizes that, if an organization would
otherwise qualify as tax-exempt, the unpopularity of the viewpoints
it espouses should not disqualify it.396 To prevent its agents' biases
from interfering with an otherwise-qualifying organization, the IRS
issued a procedure to ensure that it demonstrated "disinterested
neutrality with respect to the beliefs advocated by an organization." 397
Why is it important that tax-exempt organizations be permitted
to pursue unpopular ideas? The Supreme Court recognized that
"[t]he [tax-exempt] classroom is peculiarly the 'marketplace of
ideas."' 3 98 Moving forward, American society "depends upon leaders
trained through wide exposure to that robust exchange of ideas which
discovers truth 'out of a multitude of tongues, (rather) than through
399
any kind of authoritative selection."'
Similarly, museums, dance companies, and even churches expose
individuals to ideas that the market may be unwilling to support. 400
Yet nonprofit organizations have been central in a number of

396. Beth A. Sabbath, Tax Exempt PoliticalEducational Organizations:Is the
Exemption Being Abused?, 41 TAx LAW. 847, 850 (1988).
397. Rev. Proc. 86-43 § 2.02, 1986-2 C.B. 729.
398. Keyishian v. Bd. of Regents of the Univ. of the State of N.Y., 385 U.S.
589, 603 (1967).

399. Id.
400. Traditionally, the story of government support of the arts has been a
story of market failure. The market failure story depends on a robust theory of
the welfare state, though, a theory the grip of which has become more tenuous in
recent years. Even without market failure, though, there is a degree of path
dependency that means the market is unlikely to fully support nonprofit

organization.
Annette Zimmer & Stefan Toepler, The Subsidized Muse:
Government and the Arts in Western Europe and the United States, 23 J.
CULTURAL EcoN. 33, 34-36 (1999).

LET PROPHETS BE (NON) PROFITS

2017]

1159

important cultural shifts because they were able to espouse opinions
that were unpopular at the time. 4 1 The "comeouter" movement of the
nineteenth century, for example, saw abolitionists create new
churches that would "attempt to reform public opinion in areas
neglected by institutional Protestantism."4 02
Abolitionist churches were not exempt from the federal income
tax, of course, because there was no antebellum federal income tax. 4 03
But these types of public charities have continued to advocate for
unpopular positions into the twentieth century and beyond. 404
African American churches, for example, were central in the fight for
civil rights. 405 And even today, tax-exempt organizations like the Gay
& Lesbian Alliance Against Defamation ("GLAAD") fight for LGBTQ+

rights.406
Charitable organizations that advocate social change have a
sword hanging over their heads; as they advocate positions that may
be at odds with society, they risk losing their tax exemptions. And
that risk has a real chilling effect on their activities. 407 The ability of
tax-exempt organizations to espouse opinions that are unsupported
in the normal market economy provides them with the unique ability
and duty to function as a marketplace of ideas. Where they risk losing
their tax exemption for espousing such ideas, society risks losing new
and potentially valuable ideas.
CONCLUSION
Ultimately, if we allow tax-exempt organizations to explore ideas,
some will advocate things that society opposes. The National Policy
Institute, for example, is a think tank based in Arlington, Virginia. 408
The think tank is "dedicated to the heritage, identity, and future of

401. For example, in In re Strittmater, 53 A.2d 205 (N.J. 1947), the New
Jersey Supreme Court disqualified a bequest of an estate to the National
Women's Party on the grounds of insane delusion. The National Woman's Party
was founded in 1917 by Alice Paul to advocate for woman's suffrage. After the
ratification of the Nineteenth Amendment, the organization turned to the Equal
Rights Amendment.
National Woman's Party, NAT'L WOMAN'S PARTY,
http://nationalwomansparty.org/learn/national-womans-party/ (last visited Dec.
14, 2017). Despite the tangible successes of the National Woman's Party, giving
to the organization was part of a psyche of an insane person according to the New
Jersey Supreme Court. In re Strittmater, 53 A.2d at 205-06.
402. Ryan Jordan, Quakers, "Comeouters," and the Meaning of Abolitionism
in the Antebellum Free States, 24 J. EARLY REPUBLIC 587, 588 (2004).
403. Vaughn E. James, The African-American Church, PoliticalActivity, and
Tax Exemption, 37 SETON HALL L. REV. 371, 375-76 (2007).

404. Id. at 393.
405. Id. at 393-94.
406. GLAAD has been tax-exempt since 1989. GLAAD Inc., GUIDESTAR,
https://www.guidestar.org/profile/13-3384027 (last visited Dec. 14, 2017).
407. See James, supra note 403, at 402-03.
408.
2017).

NAT'L POL'Y INST., https://nationalpolicy.institute (last visited Dec. 14,
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people of European descent in the United States, and around the
world." 409 The National Policy Institute is exempt from taxation
under § 501(c)(3). 4 10
On the opposite side of the moral spectrum lies the Council on
American-Islamic Relations. It was founded in 1994 as a civil rights
and advocacy group. 411 It qualifies as a § 501(c)(3) tax-exempt
organization. 412 According to its web site, the Council on AmericanIslamic Relations "seeks to empower the American Muslim
community and encourage their participation in political and social
activism." 4 13
There is a qualitative difference between these two
organizations. According to the Southern Poverty Law Center, the
National Policy Institute is a white supremacist organization run by
Richard Spencer, a well-known white supremacist. 414 It does nothing
to conceal the fact that it has this specific mission. On the other hand,
the Council on American-Islamic Relations is perceived as a
progressive organization intended to benefit society.
We argue that, provided it otherwise qualifies for exemption,
allowing the National Policy Institute tax-exempt status is not per se
problematic. 4 15 While its purpose and mission may be despicable, as
part of a pluralist society allowing minority viewpoints is important.
Among other things, there is no assurance that society's norms will
always move in a progressive direction. President Trump ran and
won the election partially on a platform of anti-Islam and antiimmigration from Islamic countries. Since the election, one of the
first executive orders that President Trump executed was an

409. See id.
410. Kunzelman, supra note 389. Note that just because the National Policy
Institute has a tax exemption does not mean that exemption is warranted. If the
organization does not have a qualifying charitable mission, it should not be
exempt, even under our proposal.

411. CAIR at a Glance, CAIR, https://www.cair.comlabout-us/cair-at-a
-glance.html (last updated May 13, 2015).
412. Id.
413. Id.
414. Richard
Bertrand
Spencer,
SOUTHERN
POVERTY
L.
https://www.splcenter.org/fighting-hate/extremist-files/individual/richard

CTR.,

-bertrand-spencer-0 (last visited Dec. 14, 2017) ("'[T]o elevate the consciousness
of whites, ensure our biological and cultural continuity, and protect our civil
rights. The institute . . . will study the consequences of the ongoing influx that
non-Western populations pose to our national identity."').
415. As a matter of fact, the National Policy Institute lost its tax-exempt

status in February 2017, effective as of May 15, 2016. Matt Pearce, IRS Strips
Tax-Exempt Status from Richard Spencer's White Nationalist Nonprofit, L.A.
TIMES

(Mar.

13,

2017),

http://www.latimes.com/nation/la-na-richard-spencer

-taxes-20170223-story.html. It did not lose its exemption as a result of violating
fundamental public policy, though. Id. Rather, it lost it for the mundane reason
that it failed to file a Form 990 with the IRS for three years in a row. Id. Failure
to file for three years automatically results in a tax-exempt organization's losing
its exemption. I.R.C. § 6033(j)(1) (2012).
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immigration ban from a series of Islamic countries. 416 To the extent
that tax exemption relies on the shifting sands of fundamental public
policy, it is possible that the Council on American-Islamic Relations
could fall out of societal favor and lose its exemption. 4 17 Although this
would be a bad result, it nevertheless represents a possible future.
Additionally, neither the 1950s' formation of the NAACP nor the
1970s' formation of the Lambda Legal Defense Fund were considered
"popular" or majority positions. In 1977, Gallup started polling
whether same-sex marriage should be allowed. 418 Between 1977 and
1997, the poll numbers started at 43% and fell to as low as 32% with
a high of 47%.419
Not only does applying the fundamental public policy rule risk
punishing valuable minority voices but, as we have demonstrated, it
does not comport with tax policy. The corporate income tax was
designed to reach shareholder money and to regulate corporate
behavior. For tax-exempt organizations, there is no shareholder
money to reach, and the current exemption regime, combined with
state
nonprofit
laws,
appropriately
regulates
tax-exempt
organizations' behavior.
That is not to say, of course, that society needs to subsidize taxexempt organizations that violate fundamental public policy. But
exemption is not a subsidy.
Rather, it accurately reflects the
corporate income tax base. Subsidization occurs when donors are
permitted to deduct their donations. To the extent we want to allow
a space for minority viewpoints while, at the same time, we do not
want to subsidize speech that is opprobrious to society, the IRS should
apply the fundamental public policy rule to § 170 of the Code. By
disallowing deductible donations to bad organizations, Americans do
not have to worry about subsidizing their bad speech.

416. Ariane de Vogue et al., US PresidentDonald Trump Signs New Travel
Ban, Exempts Iraq, CNN (Mar. 7, 2017), http://www.cnn.com/2017/03/06/politics
/trump-travel-ban-iraq/index.html.
417. Ben Carson has come out demanding the IRS take action against the
group to remove CAIR's tax-exempt status. Bradford Richardson, Carson: ProIslam Nonprofit Broke the Law with Political Attack, HILL (Oct. 3, 2015),
http://thehill.com/blogs/ballot-box/gop-primaries/255857-carson-pro-islam
-nonprofit-broke-the-law-with-political-attack.
418. Lydia Saad, Americans Evenly Divided on Morality of Homosexuality,
GALLUP (June 18, 2008), http://www.gallup.com/poll/108115/americans-evenly
-divided-morality-homosexuality.aspx.

419. Id. The percentage of Americans who favored same-sex marriage was
equally low-at about 35%-when Pew started polling in 2001. Changing
Attitudes on Gay Marriage, PEW RES.
CTR.
(June 26,
2017),
http://www.pewforum.org/2016/05/12/changing-attitudes-on-gay-marriage/.

